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WHERE IS THE WORLD GOING AND WHO IS GETTING IT THERE?

Suppose we had just finished World War III.

World War III, of course, was very different from I and II.

As a matter of fact, II was infinitely more confused -- with thick traces of an international civil war -- than World War I, which had been a clear-cut, tidy, old-fashioned war; and III was so mixed up with peace that it is rather hard to say when it started and when it ended. Presumably it started with the Cold War on the one hand, and a number of wars of liberation on the other. And, just to draw the line somewhere, we might consider the official end of hostilities in Indochina as the official end of World War III. It is as good a demarcation as any other. All the nasty business that may come afterwards -- and there is bound to be a lot of nasty business coming -- we may well call World War IV.

The end of World War I gave rise to the League of Nations, covenanted "in order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war..."

World War II engendered the United Nations System "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind..."

The United Nations system is infinitely more complex than the League ever was. And so, of course, are the problems it has to cope with, in comparison with those facing mankind during the period 1918-48.

What is going to emerge from World War III can

already be dimly perceived. The United Nations World Food Conference of 1970, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment of 1972, the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea of 1974-5; the United Nations World Conference on Disarmament of 1975, and the three UNCTAD Conferences of 1971-1973 give us a pretty good foretaste of things to come. With so much peace mixed up with the war, world order in the 'Nineties will certainly be less emphatically oriented towards the prevention of war. It will have to respond to the ~~NAN~~ challenges posed by the novel development that peace may be as dangerous and destructive as war: unless we learn to cope with the economic and ecological imbalances and with the transnational effects of our macro-technologies.

date to be checked

The 'Forties, like the 'Twenties, then, were institution-building eras. So will be the 'Seventies.

One of the most forward-looking "models," in terms of peace-building rather than war-preventing, was proposed, back in 1948, by a committee of scholars at the University of Chicago. It set out:

The people of the earth having agreed
that the advancement of man
in spiritual excellence and physical welfare
is the common goal of mankind;
that universal peace is the prerequisite
for the pursuit of that goal;
that justice in turn is the prerequisite of peace,
and peace and justice stand or fall together;
that iniquity and war inseparably spring
from the competitive anarchy of the national states;
that therefore the age of nations must end,
and the era of humanity begin;
the governments of the nations having decided
to order their separate sovereignties
in one government of justice,
to which they surrender their arms;

and to establish, as they do establish,
this Constitution
as the covenant and fundamental law
of the Federal Republic of the World.

The Chicago committee had a pretty precise idea
of the whole and the parts, the cogs and the wheels and
the processes of world order.

So have a number of us today.

But what is the use of utopias? Not much: unless
one succeeds in giving to one's utopia a time dimension:
setting it into a process, bridging the gap between
now and then, here and there. and each phase of this
process must be plausible, in political, economic,
social, and scientific terms. Such a design, more than
a "utopia" in the usual sense, is a "relevant utopia,"
and the better designed it is, the greater will be its
use, as an instrument to clarify our own ideas and
concepts, as an educational instrument and, last not
least, as an agent accelerating the process of trans-
formation from the present world order, or disorder, to
a preferable one.

The creation of just such "relevant utopias" is
the gist of an ambitious study project, the World Order
Model Project (WOMP) launched six years ago by the World
Law Fund in New York, under the direction of Professor
Saul Mendlowitz of Rutgers University and the Fund's
Director, Harry Hollins.

Back in 1967 they initiated the organization of
eight nationally and regionally-based research teams,
each one of which is to elaborate a fully developed
image of the world in the decade of 1990. The teams
are: European, North American, Latin American, Japanese,
Indian, Soviet Russian, African, and Arab. A ninth, Chinese
team, does not yet exist but every effort is being made
to secure, eventually, Chinese participation in the project.

A tenth team, directed by the Norwegian scholar Johan Galtung, is transnational.

Each team is directed by an outstanding expert: The European team, e.g., by Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker, the eminent director of the Max Planck Institute near Munich, Germany. The Latin-American team is headed by Horacio Godoy, Director of the Latin American school of Political Science and Public Administration at Santiago, Chile; the North American team is led by Professor Richard Falk of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. These names are mentioned merely to give an idea of the caliber of scholarship involved, which is fully matched by the directors of the remaining teams.

The teams have met regularly, three times a year, to discuss and coordinate their work. This first phase of the project has just been concluded, culminating in a rather unusual seminar at Northfield, Mass, under the auspices of the Kettering Foundation, with the participation of the Club of Rome, the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, the International Ocean Institute (Malta) and experts from MIT and other institutions of learning.

The next step is the publication of the "World Models" next year -- each one at least in eight languages (Chinese, Japanese, Russian, English, French, German, Spanish, and Arabic) -- and a systematic effort to get the material into the mass-media, and into universities all over the world, both at the graduate and undergraduate level. This phase of the project was ~~projected~~^{illustrated}, in terms of goals and methodology, by Professor Harold Laswell.

At the same time, research will be continued and intensified, to keep world model building aligned with the most advanced thinking in the social and political sciences. The Northfield seminar was to survey

and appraise what had been done and to determine the direction of this new phase.

Space → The seminar was significant in many ways: a learning experience for all of us who participated; a sobering experience, if you will; for it became clear to anyone who didn't know it before that the road to world government is not paved with gold: it is not paved at all; as a matter of fact, there is not ^even a road; and that this cannot be blamed on the inertia of governments, the immutability of destiny or the inflexibility of mathematical curves. For if a well broken-in small group of dedicated, highly qualified, and independent thinkers and doers finds itself divided by unbridgeable chasms in the discussion of fundamental issues facing the world today -- what can you expect from the world at large?

And yet the world will keep moving, in spite of us and because of us.

Rather than summarizing the proceedings of the conference -- a task to which I could not do justice in these few pages -- I shall focus on a few issues whose implications seem to me far wider than the scope of the seminar.

The composition itself of the meeting reflected an interesting mixture or interweaving of territorial (regional) and nonterritorial (transnational) issues and approaches.

All major regions of the world were represented by their project directors, and that included China which was spoken for by Professor Paul Lin of McGill University: a Chinese-born Canadian who keeps in close personal, professional, and political touch with the land of his origin.

Each cultural "region", obviously, brings its

own bias to its world order design; but here -- as, for that matter, anywhere else today -- it was obvious that the old division between East and West, socialism and capitalism, was dead or at any rate, dying, and that a new division, between poor nations and rich ones, compounded by racial and cultural divisions, had taken its place in world affairs.

North American world-order designers, as they were overconcentrating in the 'forties and 'fifties on "atomic fear" as a compelling factor in favor of world government and, consequently, on a design for world government which would not have to do much more than to secure them against this fear -- so are they overconcentrating, in the seventies, on "ecological fear," and the question of limits to growth, above all.

There is irrefutable merit in both these positions: an atomic war, just as irreversible pollution of the planet and the depletion of its nonrenewable resources would be calamities to dwarf most other calamities. The Third-World countries, however, did not share "atomic fear" nor are they overly concerned with "ecological fear." For them, in fact, it makes little difference whether they are killed by "conventional weapons" (against which the developed nations are quite capable to defend themselves) or by atomic weapons; and poverty, for them is a worse pollutant than growth.

This, of course, is a trite oversimplification of the issue which was raised ^{initially} quite sharply by a number of participants. "What will happen," one of the participants said, "is that new industries are born, namely the industries of the anti-pollution gadget and the recycling industry....It is one of the most booming industries, and a tremendously efficient shot into the arm of capitalism." A second thing that will happen, according to the same speaker, is that economic cycles

will be reconstituted in such a way that the most polluting/depleting aspects ~~of it~~ will be located at points where there is least resistance. This has always been a fact.

Over-pollution, over-depletion, and over-population have tragically existed throughout the modern era, since the beginning of the industrial revolution. But they were confined to the poor strata of the population, and therefore, nobody cared.

Today these problems have reached the upper classes. Hence the uproar. But solutions are being sought at levels that will not come to grips with the roots of the evil and leave the basic structures untouched. "We'll get clean air with the compliments of Phillips Corporation," the speaker said, "Everything will be mediated through the corporate structures, and in the meantime, the basic structure will remain untouched."

From the Third-World point of view, instead, "the most important issue involved in making use of the environment is to change relations of predator and prey." Deep, structural changes are required for this.

Take, as an example, existing trade relations between raw-material exporting and processed-goods exporting nations (an over-simplified, but valid model for the relationship between industrialized and third-world countries.) Neither Marxist nor liberals have provided an analysis of the inequity inherent in this exchange. Said one of the participants:

An exchange that takes the form of raw materials in one direction and processed goods in the other, is inherently inequitable, inherently exploitative, because, even though what crosses the border in either direction has the same value, or at least the same market value, the spin-off effects are different on both sides. The industrialized nation profits from processing, even though it pays a price in pollution. For the non-industrialized nations the positive effects may perhaps be in terms of learning, but these are usually small, whereas the negative effects are considerable, in

terms of depletion, erosion, etc. Extraction, mono-culture, is status-quo preserving.

This remains essentially true even where huge financial profits are involved for the non-industrialized nations, as, for instance, in the case of the oil-exporting nations. Unless social change has been induced by other factors, the oil royalties, as such, tend to reinforce conservative regimes and to widen, to fabulous dimensions, the gap between the rich and the poor within the non-industrialized nation.

The same applies to the acquisition of resource exploitation rights in an extended "economic zone" of national jurisdiction offshore, which the forthcoming United Nations Law of the Sea Conference will undoubtedly grant to coastal nations. Since the acquisition of such zones will in no way change the existing structure of trade relationships, it will tend to reinforce conservative regimes (with international guarantees against the nationalization of foreign industries and investments, for instance), and thus contribute to the widening of the gap between rich and poor in developing coastal nations. It may well accelerate growth -- but whereas there can be no development without growth, there may well be growth without development.

International tourism in poor countries, which is an extractive monoculture of another kind, enhances the same type of "growth without development." In a recent survey of the gigantic tourist industry in Spain the German weekly Der Spiegel points out how this business is profitable for a select few Spaniards, but mostly for foreign investors whose booming buildings bring much money into the country, without benefit to the people. "For in the shadow of the moloch Tourism, the abyss is growing between the many poor and the few rich, the discrepancy between developed and backward provinces is mounting, social tinder accumulates, and anything that

does not promise a fast buck is doomed to wither."

Structural changes in international relations, coupled to structural change in domestic social and economic relations, thus become pressing priorities in the future designs of the developing nations.

In the Latin American models the main emphasis is on participation. Neither lasting world peace nor worldwide economic welfare nor social justice can be achieved until all the peoples of the world become equal participants in making the decisions that affect their destinies. The first decisive step toward attaining parity with the great powers in international decision making would be regional integration of economic planning and foreign policies.

Nationalism, undoubtedly on the rise all over the world, is not necessarily an obstacle to this kind of international integration. The key concept is: participation in the making of decisions that affect their own destiny. So long as there is no such participation, which means: so long as there is no ^{structure} ~~forum~~ through which such participation can be effected, the small nations, today, are in fact not "sovereign." For, such as things are today, the decisions, affecting directly the life and wellbeing, the "environment" of the citizens of small nations, are made, unilaterally, by the technologically developed nations who, theoretically, are free to supervise what is going on all over the world, from their satellites, steal the rain, change the temperature, deviate rivers, or cause earthquakes. That sounds like science fiction, but it is not. A small nation is "sovereign" only if it can participate in making (or preventing) any such decisions. In other words, in view of the development of technologies whose effects transcend the limits of national jurisdiction, "sovereignty" takes on a new dimension:

Participation. No sovereignty without participation in international decision making, no participation without sovereignty. It is indeed no chance that the sovereignty of new states is created and declared by the United Nations. Membership in the U.N. is the only valid criterion for sovereignty, and you have to be a sovereign state to qualify for membership. The decision-making role of the U.N., however, is very limited. If the small and developing nations are to be sovereign, there must be participation where decisions affecting their own destinies are really being made.

Another speaker came to a somewhat analogous conclusion when analysing the structural relationship between "autonomy" and "peace," which, he pointed out is not antagonistic but dialectic -- depending on what kind of autonomy and what kind of peace we are talking about. "In fact, he said, " the greater one kind of autonomy, the greater the possibilities of peace. If that is the case, then it is not merely a question of abstract peace and abstract autonomy being locked against each other, but a dialectic between the kind of peace and the kind of autonomy that we hope for."

Yet another speaker described this sort of relationship as one of "co-existential growth."

When you look at international integration in a mechanistic way, you come to the conclusion that the whole grows at the expense of the part (which has to "surrender" sovereignty" or, at any rate, reduce its power or autonomy); or the part grows at the expense of the whole (which weak^ens, and tends to disintegrate).

When you look at the same process in an organic way you realize that the part develops and grows as the whole develops and grows, and each part, in fact, reflects the whole at any time. This applies to the relationship

between nation and international organization as it applies to the relation between individual person and society. Integration as an additive process engenders opposition and conflict between parts and whole. Integration as a topological process engenders co-existential growth.

Here we have a difference, not only between an older, let's say, 18th-century, mechanistic world view and a more modern, organic one, we also have a contrast between occidental and oriental: For the occidental, self-realization (or development and growth) often means the development of that part of the self that is different from the others; and the more different it is, the more realized it is. For the oriental, self-realization means, rather, the development of that part of the self that is embedded in the trans-individual.

The Latin Americans, ~~too~~, stress the goal of economic justice, including the right of every citizen to a minimum of food, health, housing, education, communication and information, and transportation. The means to get there, however, is regional integration which would enable them to participate more effectively in the making of decisions affecting them.

The struggle against poverty, obviously, is in the foreground of the minds of India's world order designers as well. They call for radical changes in the patterns of distribution of the world's resources. What the Indian team considers essential is the attainment, by the decade of 1990 if not sooner, of a minimum standard of guaranteed income, so that every person can be fed, clothed and sheltered above a subsistence level. But is it "relevant utopia" or is it utopia? Where were the "plausible steps" leading to this "preferred world"? There was a great deal of resignation, not to say, despair, in the Indian's presentation.

"About the concern with nuclear capacity and the world blowing up and so on," he said, "I just don't see what utility we can have comparing the options, considering the world as it is presently structured. The decisions to use it or not to use it are not something we can speculate on. At the moment we are a passive target of history, and you are asking for a type of activism which seems really beyond our capacity."

"If I understand you correctly," one of the American participants said, "what you are saying is that the Third World is so helpless, so much target, that it cannot participate in this broader debate....I think it is a wrong position..." and the Indian said, "But that is my position, yes."

What is worse, despair may counsel not only passivity, which means, standing still, but even steps in the wrong direction.

"My final comment," the Indian said, has to do with perhaps a very sad situation which one faces, that, in order to get where many of the developed societies find themselves today, perhaps we may be forced into following a sequence of steps which one may not consider very desirable. In order to gain autonomy perhaps it is necessary to have guns. Perhaps in order to get economic welfare, one has to stay within the international market system and indulge in the same type of exploitation which one decries. This is the type of situation which poses difficulties."

Another discussant put the dilemma in more theoretical terms: to effectively refute it. He made a graphic analysis of the relationship between equality and growth. Economic textbooks in the West tell you, he pointed out, that you can have growth or you can have equality, but you cannot have both at the same time. For if you want growth you have to do a number of things that impair equality. You have to move production factors;

you have to motivate with differentials in rewards, to encourage risk. So when growth is high on one coordinate of your graph, equality is low on the other.

As soon as you add a third dimension, however, the picture changes. One candidate for this third dimension or third variable, is division of labor. There might indeed be ways of organizing production based on much less division of labor and on much less mobility, which would constitute, on the one hand, equality, and, on the other, permit quite a lot of growth. The People's Communes in China might be an illustration of such a system.

That it is organization, structure, not the limitation on natural resources, that is at the root of the world economic woes -- on that there was general agreement. Likewise, there was agreement that the solutions to the problems of poverty and resource depletion will not come from science nor from technology, but from politics: or rather from a new science-policy, merging politics and science in planning and decision-making.

A recent study, directed by Nobel-Prize winner Dennis Gabor under the auspices of the Club of Rome -- so one of the discussants reported -- came out so far ~~out~~ on the side of optimism that the meeting in which it culminated last spring in Rome, was called the meeting of the technological optimists -- a refreshing change, after all the prophecies of gloom and doom.

Crop experts, including senior officials of the FAO and eminent stock-breeding experts, all were convinced that they could feed perhaps ten times the existing world population -- on two conditions: that the tropics be fully utilized for agriculture, at the price of a further recession of wilderness; and, second,

that desalination of sea water becomes economically viable within the foreseeable future. Which means: that new sources of energy would have to bring the cost of energy down quite considerably; for the water ^{needed} ~~required~~ for irrigation would require about the same amount of energy as the total world uses today. Projects of this magnitude ^{demand} ~~require~~ an international structure different from what we have today.

If participation in international decision-making characterizes the main emphasis of the Latin American, and economic resanation, that of the Indian world order design, one might capture the essence of the African design as cultural autonomy. That this may take, at times, some forms rather disturbing to the Western mind, was indicated by the director of the African team, commenting on the tensions between peace and autonomy.

"I will address myself to what I call the rebirth of the warrior tradition in Africa, which may be just at the beginning," he said. The advent of military rule serves two functions: liberation and "law and order" -- the intrusion of the soldier into the major domains of public policy. Military rule, he explained, is a reaction to two sets of circumstances: a reaction to military disenfranchisement and the dominion of colonial military forces; and a reaction against the "feminizing" quality of Christianity that came in the vanguard and wake of the imperialistic colonizers -- a Christianity which "consolidated the so-called pacification process and reduced the capacity to rebel." There are elements in this Christianity which, "if you look at manliness in terms of readiness to resist, then this is a retreat from manliness so defined."

Like his colleague from India, the African ended up by pointing to a perhaps inevitable discrepancy between ends and means. "Maybe it is a period that we must go through -- that we need the liberation movement,

but we also need an assumption of power by the categories that have not been saturated into the intellectual traditions to which people like me have been exposed; that you need a redress of the balance by the rise of the Lumpen Militariat in African situations..."

The European design, like the Latin American, stresses the importance of regional integration. But while the emphasis in the Latin American design is on participation, the Europeans dwell more on the transitional stage of a more widely distributed balance of power. A politically united Europe could become an independent actor in the world and be in a position to disengage itself from the dominating presence of the superpowers. Such a disengagement could neutralize the superpowers' nuclear threat in Europe and thus make a major contribution to world peace. The transition from the present international system to a disarmed world -- according to one of the European designers -- could theoretically be best achieved if there were more than two superpowers. If there were between 5 and 10 major world actors (e.g., U.S., U.S.S.R., China, Europe, Latin America, India, Africa, and Japan with South East Asia), each with a credible nuclear deterrent -- according to the same designer -- and each existing in a state of relatively stable political independence, the transition to a democratically constituted, participatory world order system could be more readily achievable.

This, of course, is a far cry removed from the Nixon-Kissinger "grand design" which projects five superpowers (U.S., U.S.S.R., Western Europe, Japan, and China), blissfully oblivious of the Third World of developing nations.

"What bothers me," one discussant said, is a sense

that one can slip into freezing existing world power configurations into somehow assuming that a part of the globe has achieved what it wants, and now it's time for consolidation."

The Nixon-Kissinger design, harking back to the "concerts" of centuries gone by, is not even a "relevant" utopia in the sense of the world order model project. For the steps back into the past are less plausible than the steps into the future. Nothing is ever sure, but that the Kissinger-Nixon design is not, and will not be, of this world is a relatively safe prediction. Three of the new constellation of "superpowers" (Western Europe, Japan, and the U.S.) are, in fact, economically so interknitted that if the economic depression should deepen in the United States, the "superpower" of the other two would go down the drain together with their senior partner's. The fourth, the Soviet Union, would not stand to gain from a demise of the industrialized world to which she now, ^{by - willy} ~~willingly~~ or ~~unwillingly~~, belongs. And the fifth, China, cannot be conceived of except in the context of the Third World which is absent from the grand design of the latter-day Metternich. In sum: a balance of power between these five is blatant nonsense.

The European design is more serious. It approaches a regional structuralization of world order, and regionalism is, and is likely to be, a major component of it.

The only thing one may wonder about is: why must these regional units each be blessed with a "credible nuclear deterrent" -- at a time when the "nuclear deterrent" has lost its "credibility" even in the expiring bi-polar power structure, since (a) it cannot be used and (b) it cannot possibly be controlled

and, therefore, balanced? Without trying to look as far ahead into the future as the World Order Models Project, experts in the U.S. -- including military experts such as General Gavin -- are increasingly aware of the fact that national security and power rest not so much on military weapons as on economic wealth and ecologic wisdom: rational management of national resources, human and natural. If this is the present, can we not build this into our futures design rather than the deceptive reliance on atomic fear which is a thing of the past?

If one wanted to describe the Soviet position in one sentence, one might say that it is characterized by an ideological commitment to the poor nations counteracted by a coincidence of material interests with those of the rich nations: a discrepancy resulting in an overemphasis on technology (Soviet scientists are cooperating quite actively in the Club of Rome's computer world models) and an empiricism making the future a prisoner of the past; while the Japanese situation might be described, quite succinctly, as ambivalent between Third World values and those of the other two: with the lower strata of a socially feudal order tending toward one kind of identification, and the ruling and industrial strata, jet-setting.

The transnational team, finally, delineates three possible models. Calling the present international system of geographically based nation states a territorial system, the transnational team describes a new, emerging world system made up of nonterritorial actors. These are the International Non-Governmental Organizations, Inter-Governmental Organizations, multinational corporations, etc. Using growth rates -- sky-rocketing -- for the period 1951-68, the growth of these nonterritorial actors can be projected

and it is estimated that there will be 13,400 nongovernmental international organizations, 1,215 Inter-Governmental Organizations, and about 4,000 multinationals of various types^{by the year 2000.} This system is, in fact, growing much more rapidly than the territorial one. The next few decades will probably see novel forms of interweaving between the territorial and the nonterritorial system. The resulting structure of international relations will be so tight, and with so many overlaps, that it will be difficult to conceive of international wars in the traditional sense. This development does not ~~by any means~~ the advent of utopia or the end of organized violence; it does mean a transformation of the nature of war as well as of the conduct of international relations.

Without going into further details, I think it results sufficiently clearly from this discussion that there was quite some tension between the various regional, or cultural biases going into world order model design, but that, with the openness of mind and the dialectical intelligence of this unusual group of thinkers, these discrepancies not only can be resolved, but they give to the whole project the vitality and the depth it needs.

But there was another kind of division, of a transcultural and "nonterritorial" kind, if you wish, going through the conference. And that was far more pervasive and a lot harder to come by.

The meeting represented the whole gamma from political activist to the "pure," "value-free" research scientist, with the scholarly activist, the activist scholar, and the scholar who uses education as a means of (long-range) political action in between. At its

bluntest, the issue was between those who need time, for ever more time, to gather data and analyse data; who "don't know the system well enough and, therefore, find it dangerous to tamper with the system;" those who "speaking as political scientists, don't know what peace is, have never touched or seen it, nor measured it"; and, on the other side, those who feel a sense of urgency, who feel action-motivated. "I am frankly shocked," one of the latter group said, "that it is so difficult and there are so many things you people feel have to be done before basic action can be taken... If you will permit me a kind of image I have, it is that when this country goes completely down the drain...you will still be running around with Markovian models and systems, when you are up to your throats in garbage of different kind...It is this sort of self-defeating retreatism which I would hope could be transcended."

It is the contract between the systems analyst, bent over his omputer, who comes to the conclusion that a high rate of child mortality fulfils some systemic function in some developing nation, and therefore recommends to his aid-granting government not to tamper with the system since we don't have enough data, and a reduction in the child mortality rate might have some unstudied side effects... and, on the other hand, the revolutionary of flesh and blood. ^{Quoting} ~~To quote~~ a leading member of the Cuban Revolution ~~who~~ one of the discussants ~~reported --- he~~ said: "You from Western Europe, when you come here, you come with your fabulous theories, and you compare them to Cuba, not to find out whether your theories are correct but whether Cuba is correct; whether Cuba manages to live up to your marvelous theories... For us, the Revolution is a question of bringing milk to new-born babies.

It is the contrast, also, between the expert and the citizen, the "elite" and the "masses," internationally

as well as intranationally speaking. The reproach -- and self-reproach -- of "elitism" ran like a leitmotif through the whole conference. The problem in putting on paper "world order models" is "the terrible discrepancy between the values that such a document stands for, and the way it comes into being: the terrible elitism of this room...how do we overcome this problem? If I should point to one thing, that seems to me a key problem," one anguished participant commented.

"If I could imagine that this discussion could be satellite-broadcast, with a few hundred million people listening in, I would make a bet that 99 per cent would have switched off after the first statement. Nobody would have listened to us," another participant said ruefully.

Whose values and goals, then, are we talking about? Will we ever get any action consequent on our lugu-brations which come in a style -- the style of the American and Western European political and social scientist -- that is as atrocious to the artist, the man (or woman) of letters, as it is to the "masses?"

We are talking in riddles, one participant bemoaned.

"We need a language," another postulated -- a language that can deal with the dynamic properties of systems elements. A language that can deal with systems inter-connectedness; a language which can lead from an explicit analysis, whether verbal or computer in form, to the mental models which, after all, are destined to govern most of the globe's decisions over the foreseeable future, a language which both facilitates analysis among a group like this, and which permits communication between that group and those who actually make the decisions..."

WE NEED A LANGUAGE - pure and simple!

For else, "what kind of contribution do we make

to a change in learning, to education, throughout the world? When you publish shelves of books that nobody reads because they are written in arithmetic language -- what do you create? Are you here to discuss how to possibly contribute to change and accelerate change and direct change, or are you just here to exchange academic words?"

It cannot be said that the conference lacked dynamism, dialectics or self-criticism.

What, then, did we achieve and what do we propose?

Again: in spite of, or perhaps because of the occasional violence of the exchanges and the divergence and variety of view and approaches, one came away from the meeting with a somewhat clearer and deeper idea of the requirements of world order and of a program of action: an awareness of the "plausible steps" that should be taken from here to there, from now to then. An awareness, that is, of the identity of goal and process, a process that can be plotted, projected and measured, if not quantified. The result of the meeting was, in fact, the decision by the Directors of the World Order Models Project to fuse world order model research with "social indicator" research.

Now what on earth are "social indicators"?

The question can be answered rather simply.

You set a goal: e.g., G.N.P. The goal itself provides a measure. You can, at any given moment, compare a country's GNP with the GNPs of other countries, and order countries, according to their GNP, on a (synchronic) scale. Or you can compare a country's GNP at one point in time with its GNP at another point in time, and order these various values on a (diachronic) curve.

Only, it so happens that GNP is a very poor

"social indicator," because it is so aggregated that it covers up a number of important factors that we ought to be interested in; for it may include a lot of rubbish, such as advertising, or weapons; and it may hide huge differentials in real income, between the few rich and the many, many poor in a developing nation, and so on. So the search is on for better "indicators" a search for the concrete goals of the world order we try to advance: goals which, at the same time, give us yardsticks to measure, on synchronic scales and diachronic curves, the effects of policies, the process of getting us there or failing to do so. Peace is not necessarily a good social indicator, any more so than GNP; for it covers up too many different situations. There is peace in the harmonization of real interests; there is peace in the shadow^s of bayonets; and there is the peace of the grave yard. Social indicators must be far more precise. Economic wellbeing and social justice -- the other two goals to which the world order model project is committed, need to be subdivided and specified to become "operational."

There are certain similarities between "social indicator research" of this kind and computer forecasting model building based on what, in technical language, is called "state variables." That is: you look at a certain development, try to determine the factors or "variables" that really make it tick, and project them and read off their interactions -- as for example, the interactions of population trends, food production trends, resource depletion, pollution, energy, ^{etc.} etc. These are your "state variables," and with this method you can computerize the reconstruction of past events (e.g., the outbreaks of wars and revolutions) or you may predict the future.

Or you think you can. For needless to say, it just does not work out perfectly, and will it ever?

... social question arising from this sort of

Philosophical questions arising from this sort of game are simply tremendous. Which are the "state variables"? What is it really that makes history tick, and how valid are any predictions?

Although the scope of the "social indicators" is more modest than that of the "state variables" some of the philosophical questions they raise are the same. What are good social indicators?

There are, however, a number of differences as well, and they were elucidated by one of the participants in the conference. The state variables are more "projective," the social indicators are more normative; the former are more "physical," the latter more socio-political; the former are -- or purport to be -- value-free, the latter are based on the assumption of value and they are value-creating; they are, in fact, highly political and ideological. They are themselves, agents or instruments, either of the maintenance of the status quo, or of change. Here is a simple example. You can measure the development of nutritional standards in a country x with two different indicators. One would be the consumption of calories per person; the other would be the percentage of the population which has its basic calory needs satisfied. The relative position of the U.S. and of Cuba in the Western Hemisphere varies greatly depending on which indicator is chosen. If you take the first indicator, the U.S. is on top; if you take the second, Cuba is superior.

So the search is on for indicators which indicate and enhance social, economic, political development, which measure and advance peaceful change. This search is widely pursued today by governments and intergovernmental organizations as well as by institutions of learning. It is our hope that a systematic study of world social indicators will help to set concrete

goals for world order and measure as well as accelerate the kind of change that is inevitable if we are to survive. Whether we'll get the type of institutions needed to cope with the current changes in the nature of international relations and the nature of war and peace depends on political will and political action. The kind of institutions we are going to get depends largely on work of this sort.