

FMB

THE CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD

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The present crisis of foreign policy is worldwide and deep-seated. This is due to a number of historical trends and developments, all converging on a point where foreign policy, and its traditional instrument, diplomacy, have become obsolete. What is needed to overcome the present crisis is not so much a new policy as an entirely new approach to policy making: a new instrument for the conduct of international affairs.

1.

Diplomacy and war belong to the same system. Clausewitz's famous phrase that war is "the extension of diplomacy with the admixture of different means" can be inverted: "Diplomacy is the extension of war with an admixture of different means."

Now war has become so ruinously, disruptively, even absurdly expensive in every sense of the word that it has rendered itself obsolete; a notion that is gaining ever wider acceptance. Looking at war as an institution, and at the institution as an organism with its own evolution, one might say that, like the mammoth or the sabertooth, war has become dysfunctional, crushed by the weight of its own overgrown weaponry.

Considering the connection between war and diplomacy as postulated by Clausewitz, it becomes plausible that diplomacy has become as obsolete as war. A system that cannot accommodate war cannot accommodate diplomacy. The same technological revolution that has so fundamentally transformed the nature of war as to make it intolerable has so transformed the nature of diplomacy as to make it unworkable.

2.

Diplomacy is incompatible with democracy -- or, in other words, democracy is not geared to cope effectively with foreign affairs. This is a fact, rooted in history. Diplomacy was born with the nation-state. Permanent embassies, curiously enough,

were established at about the same time permanent armies were created. The great diplomats, like Talleyrand and Metternich, flourished under great sovereigns and monarchs.

The undermining of absolutism by the liberal thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries affected only the relations between the sovereign and the people, not the relations among sovereigns. In other words, democratic theory was introverted. When the king was ousted, the executive branch of government assumed his heritage. It was the executive branch which, for all practical purposes, was entrusted with the conduct of foreign affairs and diplomacy. But the theorists of democracy, from Locke to Rousseau to Mill, cared little for that aspect of government. John Locke described two branches, the legislative and the executive, and intuited, however vaguely, another which he called the "federative." This was to regulate the relations between states, the function of foreign policy. But Locke did not pursue these relations with any interest. The community of free citizens is self-sufficient, he held. It does not care for expansion, dislikes foreign policy and plies it only as long as other states are not organized in its own likeness. What is significant is both the lack of interest in foreign policy found in this theory and the fact that the exercise of foreign policy was conceived, if at all, as a separate branch of government apart from the legislative and the executive.

Rousseau, in The Social Contract, noted that "what matters principally to every citizen is the observance of the laws internally, the maintenance of private property, and the security of the individual. As long as all goes well with regard to these three points, let the government negotiate and make treaties with foreign powers. It is not from this quarter that the dangers will come which are most to be feared."

All went fairly well as long as foreign affairs, conducted traditionally -- historically, in an undemocratic, aristocratic, closed, and secret way -- remained marginal, less important than the conduct of domestic affairs. The relations between them

could be measured quantitatively by their respective budgets. When foreign affairs began to impinge grievously on domestic affairs, with budgets for aid to other countries, military assistance, and the cost of the arms race impeding pressing domestic programs and projects, then both democracy and foreign policy were in trouble.

The progress of democratic forces in the world community is a factor that contributes to the crisis of foreign policy.

3.

Politics in general, and foreign policy in particular, is no longer political in the classical sense but is overlaid with economic, cultural, and scientific problems and issues. This changes the nature of diplomacy. The classical diplomat was a generalist, versed in law and manners, and a great individual personality. Great individual personalities are disappearing as a feature of contemporary life. Their disappearance from the diplomatic scene is conspicuous. Diplomacy today is the product of technical staff work; the diplomat depends on the specialist -- the scientist, the economist, the man at the computer calculating action and reaction of military hardware. Secrecy need hardly be imposed: it is self-imposed because the common citizen is simply unable to cope with the complexities involved in foreign policy. The gap between the ruler and the ruled is thus widening; the undemocratic, authoritarian character of foreign policy automatically re-enforced. On the other hand, the non-political forces and interests impinging on foreign policy span the globe; science, economy, the pressure of international parties, religions, minorities and subgroups cut across all national frontiers.

4.

There is thus an inextricable connection between "domestic" and "foreign" policy. Every internal problem has an external dimension, and vice versa, and there is a feedback between decision-making in the two areas. Foreign policy, furthermore, is no longer made by governments dealing with governments, but by one country acting on the internal factions, parties, and interests

of another. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, "the object of this new form of diplomacy, if such it could be called, was to gain control of a given country by intrigue conducted from within and fostered from without." Given the interdependence of issues and of crisis areas, the relations among nations, no matter how complex, are simply no longer as important to the issues of war and peace as they used to be. Bilateral negotiations are being superseded by multilateral arrangements of "diplomacy by conference," as exemplified by the U.N. General Assembly or other more or less universal international assemblies. Diplomacy by conference is evolving in the direction of "parliamentary diplomacy," in which decisions are made not unanimously but by majorities. This, on the one hand, raises the thus <sup>far</sup> unsolved problem of representation and voting in international assemblies; on the other, it transforms the very essence of foreign policy which, as Carl J. Friedrich pointed out, is now not so much "the external aspect of self-contained systems" as "the internal aspect of supranational (regional and worldwide) systems of policy formation and control."

5.

The world community is moving in the direction of statehood, stronger polity, and an expansion of its law-making and peace-keeping capacities. The nation-state is moving in the direction of a non-state, de-politicizing, reducing its overgrown police power and the scope of its overburdened jurisdiction and granting ever wider autonomies to subgroups and groups that cut across traditional frontiers. Both are likely to meet in an area where the concept of state transforms itself into that of a community; where notions such as a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force, carried ad absurdum, lose their primary relevance; and where consensus and cooperation take precedence over coercion.

Such a community, or system, recalls the organic federalism of the late Middle Ages rather than the "mechanistic" one of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries -- Althusius rather than

Jefferson and Washington. As with Althusius, it starts from the concept of human universality and conceives the structure of this universe as rising from the bottom to an open-ended top. "Sovereignty," indivisible, unrestricted and inalienable, rests with the people, articulated in municipalities, provinces, corporations, professions. All these subsystems have their autonomy by natural right, based on the consensus of the people, not derived from state authority. They all are essential and organic members interposed between individual and state and articulating the relationships between them. The state, rising from the bottom, is a federation of all these territorial and non-territorial, political and non-political bodies. The wider community associates the more limited ones; and each limited association, as a genuine and original community, creates for itself a distinct and proper community life, ceding only as much of its own domain of law as the next higher community needs for the attainment of its specific purpose. This is the principle of subsidiarity. Basically, this is still the structure and the concept proposed in Pope John XXIII's encyclical "Pacem in Terris." The teachings of the Church, in fact, constitute one of the great pillars of the bridge we are crossing from a pre-national to a post-national order.

The pre-national concept did not arrive at a clear distinction between the federal and the unitary state, inasmuch as every state is federal; between constitutional and functional, inasmuch as the constitution constitutionalizes functions; between private and public law, inasmuch as the concept of the social contract, proposed by Althusius long before Rousseau, reduces all of public law to its origins in private law; or between national and international, inasmuch as the state is open-ended. That these dichotomies are now crumbling as casualities of the post-national order is attested by an increasing number of authorities in various parts of the world (Chadwick Alger, Jovan Djordjevic, C.J. Friedrich, Raoul Naroll, James Rosenau, among others). A number of new international organizations, straddling the international and the

intranational order, are making a new kind of law which does not fall into either of the traditional categories. Peter Hay, for example, states that the contribution of the European Communities for legal science is "the breaking up of the rigid dichotomy of national and international law.... The Communities fashion intermediate forms of law which are neither national or international law. It is municipal law in effect, federal in structure, but not national in origin."

6.

If this is the new environment in which international affairs have to be conducted, a number of prerequisites must be met.

(1) The conduct of international affairs must be generally and totally separated from the conduct of war. Its instruments must be adjusted to the exigencies of a warless system. Whether such a system can function prior to the establishment of an efficient world government with a monopoly of force is a serious question. Recent anthropological research indicates an affirmative answer. Western tradition has oversold us on the idea that peace and stability must be enforced -- or can be enforced -- by a police force. There are primitive communities, such as the Bergdama and Bushmen, able to lead an orderly existence despite their lack of courts and despite the inability of their chiefs to punish offenders in other ways. In this pattern, cooperative enterprises precede the organized exercise of coercive authority which does not emerge until there is a wide range of activity and complexity of governmental organization. In an essay "Comparison of Intranational and International Politics" (Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, R. Barry Farrell, Ed., Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), Chadwick Alger concludes, "The discovery of societies in which there is order without monopoly of force or other characteristics of the 'classic' nation-State model demands an inquiry into what factors make order possible in these societies. Several

anthropologists offer explanations that are provocative for those interested in international relations."

(2) If democracy, in whatever form, is to survive at the national level, it must be geared to cope effectively with the conduct of international affairs. This implies a re-examination of the relations between the executive and the legislative branches of government. It implies, on the other hand, a re-organization of the executive departments or secretariats as they now operate under most constitutions, and a new, decision-making role for the semi-autonomous or autonomous economic or scientific infrastructures, no matter whether they belong to the public or to the private sector.

(3) If politics in general and the conduct of international relations in particular, embrace economic, social and cultural activities and communications media, such activities and media must be brought under constitutional law just like politics.

(4) If the distinction between "external" and "internal" has broken down, new instruments must be created to deal with the new continuum. The State Department or the Ministries or Secretariats of Foreign Affairs eventually will have to be recast functionally. While in most countries this can be achieved without constitutional changes, the recasting of the departments that used to deal with "foreign affairs" implies a re-casting of all the executive departments.

7.

The systematic exploration of these problems will be the purpose of the

CONFERENCE ON THE CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD,

at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,  
Santa Barbara, California, October 12-18, 1969.

The Conference will be divided into two parts. The first part will explore in depth the reasons for the foreign policy crisis and try to derive new principles for the conduct of international affairs in an interdependent world.

The second part will be an exercise in "practical philosophy": it will apply the new principles to an analysis of actual crisis areas. It is this combination between theory and its application that distinguishes the project from similar projects in foreign affairs and international relations.

The conference will open with a dinner on October 12, with a paper by Golo Mann on International Relations in Historical Perspective: The Pre-national and the Post-national Situation.

Monday, October 13, Tuesday, October 14, and Wednesday, October 15 will be dedicated to Part I.

International Relations in a Warless System:

J. Arbatov ✓

International Relations and Democracy:

The Role of Congress and the President in International Relations: William Fulbright ✕

People's Participation in Decision-Making in International Affairs: Edward Kardelj ✕

Non-Political, Intranational and International Factors

Impinging on the Conduct of International Relations:

The Multinational Corporation: Neal Jacoby

Science and International Relations: Ritchie Calder ✓

The Mass Media (Including Satellite Broadcasting and International Relations: Harry Ashmore ✓

Thursday, Friday and Saturday will be dedicated to Part II.

South Eastern Europe: Andrea Papandreu ✓

The Near East: Abba Eban ✓

South East Asia: R. K. Nehru ✓

China: Paul Lin ✓

The Developing Countries and International Relations:

Chief Adebo

The Evolution of the United Nations: José Rolz-Bennett ✓

The background papers, excerpts from the discussion, and a critical evaluation of the whole material should make a Center Book.