

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2000

Thanks: return to origins.

You might assume that speaking of international relations in the year 2000 ~~might~~^{would} take us into the realm of science fiction or utopia. If this is what you expected, you will be disappointed. What I have in mind is less fanciful -- also less beautiful, less hopeful.

I want to look at international relations today, try to find out what has gone wrong, where, and why; discover the nature of the changes that have taken place, and see whether these changes can be structured somehow during the next 25 years: ~~or~~ whether it is possible to adapt international relations to the changes that have taken place.

Let me make two prefatory observations. All of you may be familiar with the literature of utopia during this last half century, from, let us say, Huxley's Brave New World to Orville's 1984, not mention only two. Now it may or may not have struck you that the literature of utopia projects technological change, scientific change, even social change, and it does this most imaginatively. Hardly any of these utopias touches upon human nature. Such utopias, tampering with birth and death, for instance, or changing or even abolishing sex or sin, would hurt our sensitivities much more profoundly. They would be rejected by a considerable sector of our reading public.

Now when we deal with international relations, the situation is much the same. The literature speculates whether there will be one superpower or two in the future. The

most fashionable suggestion nowadays is that there will be five. The literature faces the issue of secrecy versus democracy, it examines the influence of the military, or of the military-industrial complex. Should foreign policy be made in the white house, or in the State Department? What should be the role of congress in the conduct of foreign relations?

The Republican campaign platform spoke of a coming "golden age of ^{American} diplomacy", to be entrusted, evidently, to that quaint latter-day Metternich.

No, Mr. Kissinger will not bring the "golden age of Amweican diplomacy" -- unless ^{to Buss} we give him a time machine rather than a jet.

For the golden age of diplomacy is over. It is not its technology, ^{personally} it is its very nature that must be queried, it is the basis on which it stands, the sovereign nation state, and this will hurt a lot of sensitivities.

My second prefatory remark is connected with the first one.

We all were born in into a world order, or disorder, based on the sovereign nation state. We were all raised in the conviction that the nation state was the largest conceivable unit of social organization, and this was a fact deriving from human nature. The individuality of man, the unalterable structure of the paternalistic family, the State, with its internal and external sovereignty, these are all aspects of a coherent and hallowed Welt-

anscahung.

What we fail to realize is our own difficulty in distinguishing universals from accidentals. What we fail to realize is our own tendency to magnify the accidents into which we are born to the level of eternal and universal truths.

Thus what Freud thought to be intrinsic and eternal human qualities and problems, turned out to be the results of a peculiar society -- the Austrian bourgeoisie -- at a peculiar time: the late 19th and early twentieth century. Those of his disciples who tried to apply his theories to, let's say a Japanese during the second half of the twentieth century, was up for some surprises: The theories just would not work out the way they were supposed to. *Comparative psychoanalyses*

Thus neither the nation state is necessarily an expression of human nature and there to stay, forever, and for all men everywhere; nor is the international order, or disorder, this war system, history's last word.

One might indeed consider it a tragedy that the new, developing nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America seem to feel compelled to recapitulate European history of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Far from signifying their liberation from their former colonial overlords, this might be, instead, a final manifestation of European (and American) cultural and intellectual imperialism. Conceivably, their liberation can only *be* completed when they will have found their own form of socio-political organization, better suited both to

their indigenous character and history and to the world order of the twenty-first century./

It is also conceivable that the era of the nation state in general is about to be over, and, with it, the war system which was based on it.

And I do not say this with an optimistic gleam in my eye; I am not prophecying world government and a millennium of peace. What I foresee is less glorious. It is a situation beyond peace and war, a n era of cold war, international civil war, international guerilla partisan warfare, international terrorism, a war not declared, a peace not embodied in international treaty. What I foresee -- and Vietnam is a horrifying and extreme example of it, is a disintegration of war, a blurring of its contours and this, curiously enough, goes hand in hand with the disintegration of the nation state order, and with the blurring of the concept of national sovereignty.

Let me explain what I mean by the disintegration of war. To my mind, this phenomenon has technological and political components.

In technological terms, the so-called weapon of mass destruction has totally transformed the nature of war. In an article published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists a few years ago, Max Born provided some appalling figures on the ratio between military and civilian casualties in recent wars. In World War I, the total number of killed was approximately ten million, ninety-five per cent of whom were soldiers and five per cent civilians. In World War II, over fifty million

were killed, comprising almost equal numbers of soldiers and civilians (forty-two percent to forty-eight percent). During the war in Korea, of the nine million dead, eighty-four per cent were civilians and only sixteen per cent soldiers. The Vietnam war has Accentuated this trend.

This development removes war from the civilizing influence of international law as it had developed during the era of the nation-state, when war was "a continuance of political intercourse with the admixture of different means," as Clausewitz defined it in the early nineteenth century, the heyday of the nation-state.

International law had distinguished between soldier and civilian, military targets and open cities. It provided for the declarations of war and for the termination of the state of war through treaties, and war and peace were as sharply delineated and circumscribed as the nation-state itself. International law prescribed rules for the treatment of prisoners and the care of wounded. Until the First World War, it even imposed a chivalric camaraderie among officers of hostile armies, as Remarque pointed up so masterfully in All Quiet on the Western Front.

The weapon of mass destruction did away with all this. It brought war back to what it was before the emergence of the nation-state and the development of international law. Surprisingly, the proportion between

military and civilian casualties during the Thirty Years' War, at the dawn of the nation-state, was approximately what is now in Vietnam, at its dusk. For professional armies were rather small at that time and battle was limited. The rest was done by rapine, arson, and, on a large scale, by pestilence and black plague, a kind of "weapon of mass destruction" that did not distinguish between war or peace, soldier or civilian.

Now we have biological and chemical warfare, that does the same trick.

But the similarities between the pre-national era and what we might begin to call the postnational era with regard to war and peace go much farther. One might really make a special study of these analogies. Some of them are quite amusing: e.g., hair and beard styles, artistic tastes, especially music; the situation of the universities, ^{intermixture of languages} student power -- just to name a few. But to come closer to our topic of today: the habit -- a very bad one, -- of continuing acts of war while so-called peace negotiations are under way; the habit of continuing over long stretches of time without peace treaties -- this whole untidiness of a state neither peace nor war was quite familiar to the Middle Ages, but had been cleaned up during the intervening centuries of the modern age.

The present weapon of mass destruction is not the only factor hastening the obliteration of ~~this~~ the distinction between war and peace, a soldier and

civilian.

Modern war is no longer a war between a one sovereign nation against another, fought by national armies. It is a struggle conducted by one nation against a part of another, usually supported by internal factions or regions within that nation. Modern war has become an international civil war without boundaries, where regular armies fight alongside or against partisans, Vietcong, or other non-governmental units; a war of terror against civilians, diplomats, businessmen, athletes and airline passengers, *a war without formal boundaries.*

To some extent, the pattern of the international civil war was established by the Spanish Civil War, that Great Rehearsal. It was re-affirmed by World War II, which ended in a series of wars of liberation fought by partisan armies (Italy, France, Yugoslavia). Since then, all wars have been international civil wars.

Both the social and the technological disintegration of war are going on apace.

To come back once more to the "weapons" it is indeed increasingly difficult to define a weapon or to distinguish it from a nonweapon. This development, beginning with the introduction of chemical warfare, goes all the way back to World War I. At that time, however, it was a marginal development. It did not affect the evolution of war. That evolution was still mechanical and physical. The great air cavalry was still to come. A weapon was still clearly a weapon.

Now a number of chemical agents used in the production of chemical weapons are also used in peaceful activities. These chemicals, in United Nations parlance, belong to the "dual purpose" category. These materials may be produced for purely commercial reasons, but once they are there, you can use them for peaceful as well as for military purposes. All you need is a change of intention, for stockpiles of chemical agents produced for peaceful uses to become stockpiles ready for military uses.

Any scientific discovery, or, for that matter, any technological development is a dual-purpose agent in this sense. It can be used constructively or destructively. In a way this is nothing new. Dynamite, if you wish, has always been a dual-purpose agent. So are books.

In the past, however, the dual-purpose agent was, so to speak, a raw material. This was then put through a process of specialization in order to fashion it for either peace or war. Today, instead, the state of specialization is omitted. By "direct conversion," lasers, computers, tracking devices, remote sensors, satellites, artificial platforms, breeder reactors, can constitute a formidable arsenal.

One of the latest, and most pernicious, additions to the dual-purpose agents weaponry is weather control and modification, first experimented with by means of rain-making in Vietnam. This is what is now called "geophysical warfare." Geophysical warfare is an act or acts of environmental engineering designed to change the

flow of air and water in order to damage one side in a conflict and benefit the other. -- Once accepted as a normal military technique, the New York Times commented, geophysical warfare may someday be capable of drowning vast continental areas, turning fruitful areas into deserts, and even perhaps ultimately of radically rearranging the entire world climate."

Now, what I want to make clear, in the context of what international relations will be like by the end of this century: the disintegration of the concept of weapon, its broadening into that of dual-purpose agent, acts profoundly on both war and peace. In the last analysis it obliterates the distinction between them.

The "balance of power" and the "policy of deterrence" both presuppose clearly delimited entities to balance or to deter. Thus the United States and the U.S.S.R. theoretically, could "deter" each other, although the effectiveness of such deterrence cannot be proved in any way.

One of the brightest American Generals, General Gavin, for instance, has pointed out that whether one or both partners of a deterrence relationship possess actual deterrence, does not really seem to make any difference at all. Take the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, or the Soviet Union and the United States in the fifties, or the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. now: in one case there "is a "balance of terror" in the other case there is not -- yet the relation is the same; there is "peace"

if that is what you want to call it.

But even if we admit that, in theory, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could "deter" each other, neither of them could deter the suicide squads of guerilla fighters from attacking and destroying the nerve centers of our highly vulnerable industrialized societies. Inasmuch as an act of "sabotage" against an atomic fission breeder by a guerilla may be as disastrous in its consequences as the dropping of an atomic bomb by a hostile nation, the concept of "deterrence" or "balance" becomes meaningless. In Pentagon language, we are faced here with "non-national atomic threats," and the RAND Corporation has been busy projecting scenarios spelling out these threats. With the proliferation of fast breeder reactors "for peaceful purposes" there will be something of the order of 720,000 kg of civilian plutonium around, any five kg of which could make a bomb comparable in size to those used on Nagasaki. Five kg is a handful of Plutonium. According to the estimates of the Atomic Energy Commission, the reactor industry will probably always have an "unavoidable loss rate" of one percent to two percent of radioactive materials -- the percentage that, without causing alarm, can "disappear" in processing. By the year 2000, a one percent loss in plutonium stores would involve enough missing material to make 1,440 A bombs.

So, whom are we going to deter?

It is not only maintaining a balance of power or a policy of deterrence that has become obsolete. So has the concept of disarmament and arms control. For if "arms" can no longer be defined, how can they be prohibited or controlled. What good is an agreement not to drop A bombs -- even in the light of the facts I just presented to you -- if at any rate Americans ^{-- a Russian --} are free to drown the inhabitants of a "hostile nation" in "geophysical warfare?"

, We may, in fact actually get disarmament and arms control agreements -- at a time when the "arms" to be controlled are obsolete, strategically useless and economically ruinous.

A first example of this sort of meaningless "disarmament" is the Treaty Banning the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Seabed and the Ocean Floor. For who would want to spend money on undersea fortresses and silos, implanting and emplacing nuclear weapons in fixed, detectible, and vulnerable positions when they can be placed on submarines that escape detection and punishment?

SALT is another, savory example.

After years of costly negotiations, an agreement was reached to limit the quantity of certain strategic weapons of mass destruction. Returning from the solemn signing of the pact, the American President did not even take time to recover from his jet lag before he announced a new, multi-billion-dollar program to "improve the quality

of missiles while staying within the solemnly agreed quantity -- which neither party wanted to surpass anyway. Thus again, thanks for nothing.

The gradual transfer of the specialized and obsolescent arsenal of weaponry (including A.B.M.s) from the land, where they can be spotted by high-flying spy planes and satellites, to the opaqueness of the seas and oceans, is another significant development. The oceans are already said to hide the "second-strike" potential of the super-powers.

This development, however, will be short-lived. As the industrial penetration of the oceans proceeds, and with it the danger of pollution and collision, tracking devices and other machinery to monitor and control pollution and to regulate the many uses of ocean space are bound to multiply. These devices, too, are dual-purpose agents, in another way. Although their primary, avowed, and agreed-upon purpose may be peaceful, no military secret under the seas, in the long run, will escape their monitoring. One specialized weapons system after another will become obsolete. Adding to this the high cost of these systems of single-purpose hardware, which are usable only in wars never fought, and adding to this their rapid technological obsolescence, one may predict a series of treaties of the kind of the Seabed Disarmament Treaty or the Salt agreement, banning only what nations do not want to do anymore anyway.

We cannot even expect to make great savings by such

treaties. What is not spent on obsolete, specialized, or single-purpose hardware, will be spent on dual-purpose hardware or multi-purpose agents. "Military expense" will not be reduced: it will be diffused within the entire production system of the nation, as is already happening.

Nor are such treaties likely to increase, decrease, or in any way affect national security. For even with "arms control" in this limited sense, we now have to deal with the dual-purpose agent.

The problem is baffling. For the control and limitation of such agents implies nothing less than the control of the entire scientific-industrial production system of a nation. This suggests that we need a completely new science policy and an entirely fresh approach to resource inventorying and management, as well as a new combination of national and international measures and structures.

A number of highly original and forward-looking proposals in this direction have been put forward in the Disarmament Committee in Geneva, especially by Sweden, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia. What is of interest here is that in the "dual-purpose" world in which we are living, disarmament and arms control programs converge with measures which have to be adopted anyway if we want to give life and reality in any way to the /resolutions adopted by the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment or the Principles adopted by the U.N. General Assembly for the peaceful uses of ocean space

and resources. In other words -- and this is an entirely new situation -- the technologies and the institutional arrangements we need to control the new type of weapon/nonweapon, or dual-purpose agent, are exactly the same we need to implement environmental and developmental policies.: tracking devices, satellites, electronic data gathering and retrieving devices -- and the collaboration between science and industry and government, national and international.

There is onemore phenomenon that is entirely new and that is about to transform international relations as profoundly as asthe change in the nature of war and peace, or the state beyond war and peace in which we are living. Add that is that the "peaceful" uses of the dual-purpose agents of modern macro-technology may be as destructive as their warlike uses. Besides, they all transcend the limits of national jurisdiction. Their effects are global or atleast transnational. If they are to be managed at all, they must be managed international, and only effective management can exploit their productive potential. If left unmanaged, their destructive potential will prevail. The disastrous effects of their "peaceful" unmanaged uses will in fact equal the disastrous effects of their warlike uses. The unilateral use of weath~~e~~r modification, resulting in "geophysicide," no matter whther done under the auspices of war or peace, provides an example. We have referred to the potentially disastrous effects of the peaceful uses of atomic energy: the uncontrolled

release of radioactivity; atomic accidents. Another example might be the accidental raising of biospheric temperatures due to uncontrolled high energy production; pollution of land, water and the atmosphere, etc. Just as with the warlike uses of the dual purpose agents of macro-technology, their uncontrolled, unmanaged "peaceful" uses affect not only nations but individuals directly. They act on the "quality of life."

The "marine revolution" -- or the extension of the Industrial Revolution into the depth of the oceans -- is a transnational force of this type. If left uncontrolled, the race for the traditional as well as the new resources of the seas can only lead to final depletion, pollution, conflict and chaos. But if they are managed rationally, which means, internationally, ocean resources and technologies will add substantially to the wealth and wellbeing of all nations. — Substantive progress: Centre - 101 UK importance: new type model of international order

The "communications revolution," culminating in satellite technology with its tremendous potential for earth-resource monitoring and planning, the control of "military" developments, and direct transnational television, etc., provides another example. If left uncontrolled, this technology bestows on its "owner" an enormous and intolerable advantage. Without "war" or territorial conquest, the owners of such systems can set up a new type of functional world empire, inevitably, in the twilight between war and peace, reinforcing the trend toward the

latest kind of guerilla. Only rational international management can maximize the productive potential of this transnational technology.

The "energy" revolution" likely to bring, during the next decades, the Oil AGE to a close, provides still another example. New sources of energy, far cheaper than any man has tapped so far, and inexhaustible (nuclear fusion) are now within reach. The economic, social, and geopolitical consequences of this revolution will be dramatic. Cheap, inexhaustible energy may accelerate the economies of the developing nations and transform people's perception of "national interests" For example" who will care about jurisdiction over continental shelves or about the political "stability" of oil-exporting nations, if the demand for energy is met by an unlimited supply of deuterium from the seas? The twilight of the great multinational oil empires will mingle with that of the great territorial superstates.

If the limited (and poorly distributed) energy produced by the Oil Age caused congestion and pollution, the energy of the Fusion Age, available to all people everywhere by the end of the next half-century, may cause even more staggering problems. Left unchecked, it could actually alter the temperatures of the biosphere. Global planning over a regionally decentralized energy network is absolutely essential if all nations are to reap the benefits from this impending revolution.

The meteorological revolution is also with us. Weather control and modification are already an available tool for increasing agricultural production and improving the quality of life. The possible misuse of meteorology as a "weapon" has been referred to. If uncontrolled, the effects of its "peaceful" uses will be indistinguishable from its "warlike uses. Global, international planning and control, again, are mandatory.

We hear a lot, these days, about the residuals or revivals of "nationalism." We hear a lot about "sovereignty" which stands in the way, an irremovable obstacle to the irresistible forces I have just described. Let us not deceive ourselves. Nationalism in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is not what it used to be in the nineteenth: it was creative then, it is defensive today. And sovereignty is a complex matter. It is not that we wish to, or have to "abolish it" to turn it over to a superstate. Nothing of the sort. What we ought to recognize is that sovereignty, just like everything else, is in a process of transformation. It is taking on a new dimension.

In the past, at the time of Locke, etc., it was assumed to have two dimensions -- an internal and an external dimension. The Sovereign had sovereignty over his subjects; the nation was sovereign visavis other nations. Sovereign, of course, meant "supreme."

The new dimension that Sovereignty is assuming today, and which affects both its former "internal" and "external" dimension -- and there is no longer any neat distinction

in an independent world

between the two -- the new dimension of sovereignty is participation .

Let me illustrate with an example: One of many.

The United States is contemplating the construction of a sea-level canal to replace the Panama Canal, which is no longer adequate to modern shipping needs.

The sea-level canal would, conceivably, profoundly alter the ecology of the entire Caribbean area; it would affect the economies, the military situation, the politics of seventeen "sovereign" Caribbean nations.

The decision to build or not to build this Canal is made by one nation, and by one nation alone. Where is the sovereignty of the Caribbean nations? Their sovereignty could be restored only if there existed a regional, international, or rather transnational body, in which they could share in the making of a decision that affects them all. Only participation in decision-making would give them sovereignty. /

It is not a chance that that to be a member of the United Nations, to participate in international decision-making, one has to be a sovereign nation; and that, on the other hand, sovereignty is something that is attributed by the United Nations.

So, the new dimension of sovereignty is participation. Sovereignty is continuously created and recreated by participation, just like freedom, the freedom of the individual, the very individuality of the individual is created continuously by his interaction with the environment.

Individuality and freedom can have no other meaning today.

So nationalism or sovereignty would not seem to me to be obstacles that would necessarily frustrate the processes of integration history has embarked us in.

Each one of the transnational forces and technologies calls for a new form of international organization, based on new forms of cooperation among politics, science, and industry. This development, in turn, calls for a recasting of the instruments of "foreign" policy-making at the national level.

A foreign policy which is molded in terms of blocs, alliance, negotiating from a position of strength and relying on nineteenth-century diplomacy is obviously out of kilter in the world we live in. It can only intensify and accelerate the process of general disintegration.

If wars can no longer be won, they should no longer be waged. If the aim of foreign policy is the establishment and maintenance of peace, with war, or the threat of war as last resort, things are bound to go wrong when the last resort can, in reality, no longer be resorted to and we are living in a state beyond peace and war. If the security of the ^{State} ~~citizen~~ no longer coincides with, and even conflicts with, the security of the citizen, it is time for a fundamental reappraisal of the whole situation. If foreign policy is no longer foreign, but affects the citizen directly and interferes with every

aspect of his domestic life, the citizen ought to be in a position to participate in the making of foreign policy. Or else democracy is doomed to wither.

It may be a shibboleth that foreign policy must be made by the executive branch of government. This is an inheritance from monarchy. The Sovereign Monarch had the privilege to conduct his own relations with other monarchs. Democracy, which was a philosophy and a theory that was almost exclusively inner-directed, that is, concerned with the relations between rulers and ruled, did not touch on the conduct of international relations. In none of the great theoreticians -- from Rousseau to Mills to the Americans -- will you find very much about foreign relations. Foreign relations were left to the President, who was the heir to the king. Just like the motor of the automobile was left in front of the car, because the horse had been in front of the carriage: for no other reason.

Now this was hardly very important as long as foreign policy and international relations were not so important: so long as the budget for internal affairs was bigger than that for external affairs, if you want to quantify the issue. When this proportion got inverted -- when foreign affairs, with its budgets for the arms race and foreign military aid and intervention -- began to dominate foreign policy, the matter became serious. The more democratic the country, the more serious it became. Hence the constitutional crisis in the greatest of the democracies, in the United States -- and there are very few guide lines as to how to resolve this crisis.

If sovereignty, today, is participation, then this participation, just like sovereignty itself, has an external

and an internal dimension. Participation of nations in decision-making on trans-national problems affecting them; participation, internally, of people in the making of foreign policy which is no longer foreign.

Since the structure of the nation-state is fossilized whereas the structure of international relations is fluid and flexible, it is likely that this change will manifest itself at the international level first. *There are some ^{rather serious} points to the*

There are already a number of indications pointing in this direction, between nations.

Think of the enormous role nongovernmental organizations are beginning to play in these transnational questions. of many examples I will mention only the Stockholm conference on the Human Environment. This was really a two-chamber conference: the representatives of Governments, and the representatives of nongovernmental organizations. And the influence, even the pressure, of this second chamber ^{including also many organizations of scientists} on the first was quite considerable.

Or take the so-called multinational corporation. The nation-state has become too small as a market for producers. Hence the emergence of these gigantic organizations who operate across boundaries and really transcend or evade the nation-state structure of the world. For good or for evil.

To meet this challenge, also labor is beginning to internationalize or transnationalize its operation. Labor, of course, until recently, and contrary to the expectations

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Treaties and foreign
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France : Maurice

of Marx and Engels, had been, on the whole, a conservative force in this respect: and strictly nationalistic in its outlook. Now, the unions begin to understand that if they want to deal on an equal footing with the transnational expansion of industrial management, they must internationalize as well, and there have recently been significant initiatives in this direction.

So the structure of international relations has changed. They are no longer inter-national, that is, relations between nations, or one-dimensional, that is political; they are transnational and they are polyvalent that is, they are still based on nations, but they are increasingly also based on an input from science, from industry and labor. The international organizations or institutions we are building now -- and we are living in what the Ford Foundation recently called "a new era of international institution-building" will therefore have to be essentially different from the international institutions we built twenty five years ago, ~~that~~ is, the U.N. family of organizations. What I foresee is a network of partly functional partly political, partly governmental partly nongovernmental, nonterritorial communities, managing the new transnational technologies and resources. *what mean: using them productively and thereby preventing a control by the war-like states.* The system of territorial nation-states will be interwoven with this transnational system of which the international ocean regime will be the first, and quite probably the model.

And the new dimension of sovereignty will be participation, both externally and internally.

Now I don't say the new system will be better or worse than the old one. It will be different because the fundamentals on which it is

based, are different. And all the inertia and all the greed of nations can not stifle this change.

Inertia and greed, for that matter, are "dual-purpose agents" as well. Inertia may take the form of the instinct for survival. And there is wealth in the new approach: resources and energy which no nation by itself can attain, let alone enjoy. So they might as well join to get them.