




Wm. H. ...
...
... April 2 1873.
I...

We ... the ... as
the ... 39 years ... when it too
sank ... 562 ...
... the ...
... child except
...
... with his parents and brother
... on his way to New York.

... 1873 ... 1873 ...

I ...
...
...
...
the



The ...
...
...
...

The ... of the trial
on ... April 3 - 1873 ...
...

James A. Williams Captain of the wrecked Steam
ship Atlantic having been sworn said that
when he arrived in Halifax the day after
the wreck he prepared a statement of the
particulars of the disaster to be sent by mail
to England for the information of the owners, and
he asked permission to read some portions of that
letter as his statement, which was as follows
On the twenty eighth day of March the
Engineers report showed the Coals getting
short we having experienced then three very
severe days weather. Coals on board 319
tons ship 1130 miles from Sandy Hook.
reducing the consumption the speed
came down to 8 knots and with moderate
strong breeze to 5 knots per hour. hoping the
wind would change favorably I kept on till
the 31st when our coals were reduced to
127 tons and ship distant from Sandy Hook
466 miles (Lat- $41^{\circ}39'$ N Long $63^{\circ}54'$ W)
The ship at this time was making seven
knots per hour. The wind at S.W. glass
falling and a westerly swell I thought
the risk too great to keep on as in the
event of a westerly gale coming up
we might find ourselves shut-out from
all sources of supply at one o'clock P.M.
after receiving the Engineers report I
decided to come here. Sombro Island
bearing then ^{North} 5° E true distance 190
miles. We got both anchors over the
bow the leads ready and ~~overhauled~~ ^{armed} on
the lead lines ready and overhauled
during the afternoon. The wind was
S. S.W. with rain. at 8 P.M. the wind

peered to West-clear starlight. I took several azimuths by the sun during the afternoon which gave 9° Easterly deviation. I also several times corrected the course by the Pole Star during the night, which gave the same deviation as above. The course steered by Compass was $N 24^{\circ} E$ with 9° Easterly deviation which I considered ample allowance for the westerly set and to lead 5 miles to the East of Sambre Island ledges. I left my orders on the bridge as to look outs, which word was passed to the officers relieving at Midnight second and fourth. I corrected the course the last time at 12.20 A.M., when I repeated my caution and orders. I then went into the Chart room and sat down. in about fifteen minutes a Mr Fisher came in to ask some particulars about the ship as he was writing to the Cosmopolitan news paper; he stayed about twenty minutes then left. my intention was to run on till 3 a.m then leave the ship to stand await-day. At midnight the ships run by my estimate was 122 miles, which would place her 48 miles South of Sambre. the speed by log at 1.30 being nine knots (4th officers report) per hour the night at this time was cloudy and clear. at 2.40 my servant came up with as ordered my cocoa when he was told not to awake me till 3 A.M. when the second officer would call me the

first intimation I had of any thing was
 the ship striking on Marris Rock off
 Meagher's Island, and remaining heeling
 slightly to port, the officers were quickly
 at their stations, accompanied by the
 Quarter Masters, the first sea swept away
 all the port boats, and the ship heeling
 over rapidly soon rendered the Starboard
 boats useless, every effort was made to
 send the people forward outside the ship
 but the short time defeated all our
 efforts. The second officer was in the
 Starboard life boat, I carried two ladies
 and placed them with him and returned
 for more, before I got as far as the
 Saloon entrance, I found the ship going
 over still further, I managed to get hold of
 the weather sails and got back to the life
 boat I took the ladies and placed them
 in the main rigging and went back. I
 called to 2nd officer to come out as the
 boat would roll over which she did in a
 few minutes carrying him with her and
 30 or 40 men, finding I was of no
 use there I returned to main rigging
 and found the ladies had gone. The
 Chief officer Mr Herth got up into the
 main rigging, where his retreat was
 soon cut off, and he had to remain
 there until 3 P.M. when the sea moderat-
 ing with falling tide he was got off
 Mr Brady third officer finding the
 boats useless went forward and with
 the assistance of Quarter Masters
 Speakman and Owens established

communication by a rope to a small
 outlying rock distant from our
 starboard bow about 40 yards. Owens
 swam first but failed to get a footing
 speakman then tried and succeeded.
 a stout rope was hauled on the rock
 along which Mr Brady passed followed
 by the boldest of the men. by this time
 it was 4 A.M. I was at this time in
 the main rigging trying to get the
 passengers there collected. to make
 an effort to get forward. many went
 but the larger number (several salmon
 passengers) lay there and died. the
 Purser was the first to succumb to
 the intense cold that prevailed. finding
 myself of no use there. I got along
 outside the ship to the fore rigging and
 got the foresheets and tacks unrove and
 sent ashore. we now had five ropes to
 the rock along which men to the number
 of 200 passed safely though nearly
 exhausted on reaching the rock. Mr.
 Brady accompanied by Quarter Master
 Owens and speakman ~~and Thomas~~
 now got a line across the inner
 channel which was about 100 yards
 wide and shallow. though with a heavy
 surf running through. they then went up
 and gave the alarm and sent a messenger
 to Halifax. about fifty got to the larger
 Island by the line though many were
 drowned in the attempt. amongst the
 number who were drowned ^{was the chief steward} by the passengers
 crowding him down. I with the fourth

officer Mr Brown encouraged as much
 as we could the people about 450 in
 number who remained on the ships side
 to keep moving and from falling asleep
 In morning ^{morning} they gave entirely up and died
 apparently without any pain. twelve
 men clinging together laid down beside me
 and despite of all efforts to arouse them
 died and slid into the sea. At 5.30 AM
 the first boat came but she was too small
 to be of any use. in about twenty minutes
 the first large boat was launched and
 proceeded to take the passengers off
 the small rock. she was in half an
 hour followed by two other boats. I
 succeeded fearing the ship would part
 and slide into deep water in getting
 the boats to take on shore men from the
 ship first and many were saved who
 if left there till the last would have
 perished from exhaustion. At this time I
 missed the fourth officer and feared
 he had fallen in when I saw him on
 the rocks encouraging and helping
 another boat along. when all had left
 but about thirty men, my hands being
 frozen and my legs stiff, they took me
 off the rest following immediately At
 8.45 AM all the survivors were landed
 and lodged in a wooden hut belonging
 to a fisherman named Clarence. who
 with his daughter gave them all they
 had. made fires and warmed them
 all the day. they were drafted off to
 the various Islands about and billeted

amongst what-houses there were. Mr Ryan the Resident-Magistrate filling his house and the others following his example. At 1 Pm I sent Mr Brachy to Halifax to give particulars obtain food and assistance, also to get steamers down early and convey the passengers and crew to Halifax. At 5 Pm the tide having fallen she broke in two abaft the foremast, the ship falling over the sea washed completely over. Her cargo was now washed out, having no other officer at hand, I detached the Boatswain and eight men to prevent the wreckers, who now swarmed around from carrying away the saved goods and left a watch of four men during the night. to pick up the bodies of such as might wash ashore. they picked up but five during the night. At daylight the Custom Authorities came down and took charge. I gave Captain Sheridan provisional authority to employ what labour he required for salvage, with the understanding that the Salvage should not be over 40% of nett value and if this was objected to, to leave it to leave it to the arbitration of two Justices of the Peace. We embarked all our saved amounting to about 429 in the S.S. "Lady Head" and "Delta" and arrived at Halifax at 3 Pm. where Mr Morrow the Cunard Agent (who had promptly afforded us every assistance) had places prepared for all. I have

7
given the Company's Carpenter orders
to get about 200 Shells to bury the
dead, and an undertaker to attend
to the Saloon passengers bodies and
second officer, as their friends might
want them to be forwarded

Mr Ritchie

Examined by A. Thomson Ritchie Esq &c

Mr Blackhead

On Monday afternoon the leads were
got ready and lines attached and
coiled on the Bridge, the Anchors
were also got ready

I was last on the Bridge at a quarter
past twelve that night and compared
course with Standard compass for last
time at twenty minutes past twelve

Up to eight o'clock it was raining hard
from eight to twelve it was star light
after twelve it was clear with clouded
sky and stars occasionally visible

After leaving Bridge I went to Standard
Compass and then to the Chart room

The Chart room was thirty feet
abaft the Bridge on the Upper deck
within easy call of the Bridge, the
Man who steered the ship was
within six feet of me. I remained
in the Chart room from time I left
the Bridge until she struck

After making observation at noon and bearing up for Halifax at one P.M. I allowed eleven knots an hour as an average, until twelve o'clock at night running from seven and a half knots up to twelve knots per hour, and running eleven hours

At twelve o'clock at night the third officer reported that we had made one hundred and twenty two miles since bearing up for Halifax

I supposed that at three o'clock we would be from eighteen to twenty miles South of Sambro

After I left the Bridge I did not divest myself of my clothing

I had every confidence in the second officer.

I had no reason to doubt his efficiency he was a sober and steady man

~~to Cross~~ ^{Cross} Examined by ^{Hercim Mr. Blanchard} ~~Hercim Blanchard~~ &c
for Retire

We bore up for Halifax on account of shortness of Coal

I got my latitude by observation and both chronometers agreed

I knew my distance from Halifax

All the Charts have been lost.

After we bore up I steered North twenty four degrees East with a deviation of nine degrees East by Standard Compass

After we bore up for Halifax our speed increased up to twelve knots

Wind was abeam about West-north West.

There was no canvas set

At twelve at night I reckoned that we were about forty eight miles from Sambro. Sambro bearing from us about North five east magnetic being North Eighteen degrees West true

I did not slack the speed nor change the course at midnight, which course I reckoned would take me from five to seven miles East of Sambro lights

I have never been in this coast before

The third officer had been in Halifax harbour twice before

From the time I considered I was forty eight miles from Sambro I did not use the lead

The Charts used were Admiralty Charts

I do not recollect what soundings the chart shewed

I knew that I was within soundings

I did not sound because the night was clear, and Sambre light should be visible in clear weather twenty one miles and in moderate weather fifteen miles

An officers eye would be about thirty six feet above the level of the sea while standing on the bridge

I certainly supposed that because of the clearness of the night we would see the light at Sambre

From subsequent facts ascertained I now ~~think~~ know that I must have been mistaken in the position of the ship at midnight

The ship was further to westward at midnight than I supposed. Ship got set westward and somewhat northward between time of observation and time of striking

I was aware that it was a dangerous coast

^{and was} ~~Captain~~ ^{Captain} was here shown Chart and pointed out position (on Chart marked D.) of ship at time he bore up for Halifax and marked on said Chart, the point or position

of ship at one o'clock P.M. being the time when the said ship was declared for Halifax.

^{Captain}
~~business~~ also marked on said Chart. the position of said ship at twelve o'clock at night as he supposed

I would not have got into less than forty five fathoms of water until I was within thirteen or fourteen miles South of Sumbro and I intended to stop the ship when about eighteen or twenty miles South of Sumbro

I was mistaken with reference to the position of the ship at midnight

The ship must have been set with the current North and West more than I supposed

If I had remained between twelve o'clock and the time she struck we would not have gone ashore for I would have been on deck myself

When I left the deck to go into the Chart room I left the second and fourth officer and three Quarter Masters

The second officer was lost

This was my second voyage to America in the Atlantic

12
I have no knowledge of what was passing
on the ship from the time I laid down
at one o'clock until she struck

I had been on deck all the first-part
of the night-

It was starlight the first-part of night-

There was not much of a sea outside
but considerable swell near the shore

The ship was going between nine and
ten knots per hour when she struck

The shore was moderately high

She appeared to run on a shelving rock

When I left the wreck there were only
between fifteen and thirty persons remaining
upon it-

I make this statement- because a Mrs Stammers
has been published in the papers to the
effect- that I was about the fifteenth
or sixteenth- person to leave the wreck

The third officer reported to me that
there had been nineteen persons rescued
from the wreck after I left it

The reason I left the wreck when I did
was because of being so benumbed
and exhausted that I could not render any

further assistance

I met with an accident last year whereby I had my leg broken, and was otherwise injured, which made me more sensitive to the cold

I was asleep when the Ship struck

I looked at my watch when she struck it was five minutes past three, the clock in the Engine room marked fifteen minutes past three - it was between five and fifteen minutes past three when she struck

In reply to

~~Examiner~~ by ~~Edm Macdonald Esq~~ the Collector
Commissioner

I left orders with the relieving Officer to be called at three o'clock, previous to which I had left orders with my servant to be called at forty minutes past two o'clock

I cannot say that I was called at three o'clock, at any rate I was not awakened

If I had been called at three o'clock, I think the night was clear enough to have enabled me to see the land and thereby to have averted the calamity

^{Commissioner}
The Collector here ~~captained~~ the Captain, as
answering any question which might
tend to exonerate himself as the same would
be taken down in writing and might at some
future time be used as evidence against him

The white line of snow upon the land might have been made out at from two to three miles distance

I am of opinion that the men on the look out and the officers on duty might have been able at that distance to have seen that something was ahead. and if the officer of the watch had promptly given the order to reverse the Engines the calamity might have been averted

Since I have commanded Steam Ships I have always made it a rule to associate all the officers of the ship in the navigation thereof. so that each and all are equally conversant with my self. with the position of the ship and the deviation of the course steered by the compass.

Each ship is supplied with a printed copy of the orders and instructions given by the company for the exercise of vigilance when approaching the coast

The instructions particularly caution as to collision fire and wreck.

There are no particular instructions. as to the action of officers in charge of a ship when approaching the coast. with reference to sounding. full powers are given to officers in charge. to reverse Engines. or change course in emergency without referring to Captain

19
15
I cannot recollect any special order
in those instructions with reference to
something when approaching the coast.

Sworn to at Halifax)
in the County of)
Halifax this 5th. } Jas a Williaims
day of April 1883)

Before me

Chas Macdonald

Court adjourned at one thirty Pm
to resume at three Pm

Charles J. Macdonald
Clerk to Commission

20
17
Samuel Minnane sworn examine by Hon S^d Pham
I was a Salom passenger on board S^d Atlantic

I joined at Queenstown

On Monday March 31st - it was stated on board the ship that the Captain had headed the ship for Halifax.

I was on deck as late as half past ten that night. Weather was moderate light breeze and stars occasionally visible.

I went to the smoking room at half past ten and remained there until eleven.

I then went to my stateroom and went to bed and fell asleep.

I slept until I was awakened by the noise occasioned by the ship striking the rock.

When first-awakened by the noise I heard the Steward call for all to turn out. I clothed and went on deck where I found about twelve passengers only.

When I got to deck I found the sailors and officers running about apparently confused - I asked the

I met the purser and asked of him. What are we to do. The purser replied do the best you can.

About ~~two~~^{two} minutes afterwards rockets were fired from the ship -

at that time I was about-or near the
gunnel - I then heard a loud report
as of an explosion

I had no idea of what time it was

The vessel was shaking very much and in
a few minutes afterwards she turned over
on her side

I got up in the rigging and clung by a rope
to the ~~ships side~~ and there I remained
until daylight - I think about an hour
after daylight - I saw attempts made to
reach the rock, one man at least reached
the rock

I saw several men drown in the attempt
to reach the shore by swimming

I hung to the ships side for about six hours
I then found that the stern was sinking

I was in the main rigging I made my
way then to where the Captain was, in the
fore rigging. He was encouraging the passengers
to take the rope leading to the rock and
told them if they clung to the ships side
they would perish - I asked of him
what I had better do, he told me my
best chance was to take the rope - I
then caught the rope and jumped into the
water and passed over to the rock.

At the time there were three ropes leading
from the ship to the rock -

After reaching the rock I there remained
for about an hour

About two hundred persons were in the
water when I reached it - I then jumped

into the water from off the rock and was pulled into the boat which had been brought there by some fishermen

I believe that the Captain did all in his power to save the passengers after the ship struck. during the voyage the Captain appeared very attentive to his duties.

I have seen the Captain taste anything stronger than lemonade. He refused to take wine or dinner

In answer to question by Commissioner.

It was daylight before the passengers commenced landing from the wreck.

I cannot say from my own knowledge that the steerage passengers were kept below after the ship struck

I saw nothing that would lead me to believe that they were prevented from coming on deck

As far as I know the Officers were all very attentive to their duties throughout the voyage.

Landed at Hakapa in the Center of Hakapa. this fifth day of April A.D. 1873. Before me
E. H. Macdonnell

J. Kanneke

Charles W Allen sworn

Examined by Mr Shannon

I was a Saloon passenger on board the
Steamship Atlantic

I was awake when the ship struck
I was the first Saloon passenger that
reached the deck

I looked over the side of the vessel and
saw what I supposed to be land
at a distance of about one hundred
yards from the ship

I got into the rigging and by the
rope I got to the rock

I believe that a great many more lives
might have been saved if the ship
had been manned by efficient seamen
properly disciplined

While in the rigging I observed a great deal
of confusion. The Captain did not
seem to be able to get any number
of the crew at hand to perform any
duty efficiently.

For three hours after the ship struck
I observed one boat. it was the first
boat on the right hand side after
passing the wheel house going forward
it was then in good condition. and I
believe that if a crew could have been
found. it might have been launched

24
21
the ship at this time had heeled
over but the boat appeared sound

My impression from the first day
I was on board, was that although
there might have been the proper
number of a crew. Yet I do not
think that they were all of them
efficient seamen

I think that the Captain and officers
after the ship struck exerted themselves
to the utmost of their capacity and
the best of their judgment

Cross examined by Mr Ritchie

I considered the Captain and officers
were competent

At the time I observed the boat the
deck was sloping at an angle of forty
five degrees or more

I am not acquainted with naval
matters, and do not know of the
difficulties of launching boats. I knew
it would be difficult to launch the boat
under the circumstances but did not
consider it impracticable

Sworn to at Belief in
the County of Belief
this fifth day of April
1873. Before me
Jm Macdonald

} Charles W Allen
}
}
}

I Spencer Jones sworn
Examined by Mr Shannon

I joined the Steamship Atlantic at
Queenstown as a Saloon passenger

On the night of the accident I remained
up in the smoking room until after
Eleven o'clock

I retired to my State room about Eleven
o'clock. While in the smoking room the
Captain came in. He was asked to have
a glass of wine but refused

I was awakened by the noise occasioned
by the ship striking the rock

Dressed myself and rushed on deck
After she struck the punser was
endeavouring to awaken the passengers
When I arrived on deck everything
appeared in confusion

The Captain was then endeavouring to
get some persons into a life boat

About Eight minutes after ship struck
she heeled over

I got on the end of the Budge

I saw men swimming to the shore
this was before daylight

The Captain was then under the foremast
holding on to a rope from her side

he was encouraging the men to take the rope
the third officer was on the shore.

I got to the vessel by the rope

I was taken off by the fishermen's boats.
The Chief Engineer was on the rock wearing a hat
I have been engaged in the Shipping business
many years. (seven years) and during the
passage out in the Atlantic I observed
that the discipline on board was
admirable, and the conduct of the officers
everything that could be desired.

The officers were attentive to their duties.
After the disaster nothing could be done by
the officers to save life more than was done.
About one third of the cabin passengers were saved.
Along the corridor there were a number of
life buoys and I think that the passengers
remained below too long endeavouring to get
them and by that means were drowned
in the Cabin.

I saw no efforts made to keep the
steerage passengers below.

I saw the after hatch leading from the
steerage open.

I think that any report circulated to
the effect that the steerage passengers
were prevented from coming on deck is false.
After the vessel heeled over on her side it
was impossible for the steerage passengers
to come on deck.

Sown to at Halifax in
the County of Halifax
this fifth day of April
A D 1873 Before me

I Spencer Jones

Em Macdonald

Nicholas Brantlett Sworn
Examined by Mr Shannon

I was a Salmon passenger on board the
Steamship Atlantic

I was last on deck at Eleven o'clock on the
night of the accident-

I was awakened by the ship striking the rock

I dressed myself, went out into passage took
a life preserver and went on deck

I went on weather side of vessel I went
into wheel house, and held on to the wheel
Some person opened the door and we went
out on the weather side from the front
window of the wheel house.

After coming out of wheel house I got into
the rigging where I remained about an hour
until daylight, and then seeing that
the vessel was sinking at the stern I
worked my way to the foremast where
I remained until taken off by the boat-
some boat took the Captain off.

about twenty remained on the wreck
when I left it

25
I have been frequently at sea. This was my sixth voyage by the White Star line.

I have crossed in other steamships besides the White Star line.

Conduct and discipline of officers and crew of Atlantic was very good.

The officers were always constant and energetic in the performance of their duties.

Nothing more could be done than was done for the saving of the lives of those on board.

The companion way leading to both forward and aft stowage were open and there was also access through the passage of the state room ^{the aft} to both stowage cabins.

The following is from the observation as taken every day.

Atlantic 20 March 1873.

Left ~~Queenstown~~ ^{Liverpool} at 2 P.M. - 21st arrived at 9 A.M. at Queenstown. Left Queenstown at 10.30 A.M. March 22 - 344

23	300
24.	294
25	196
26.	118
27	244
28	189
29.	238
30	264
31	169

One P.M. turned for Heligoland short of Coal.

From the time the ship struck until she heeled over it would have been impossible to close the hatch ways

While in the wheel house the ships clock marked eighteen or nineteen minutes past three she was then heeled over and the water was pouring down the hatch ways.

I sailed as passenger in the Steam Ship Republic commanded by Captain Williams, and he then bore an excellent character.

Captain Williams was standing below me on the side of the vessel encouraging passengers to keep in motion and keep up their spirits, and helping them into the boats, where he had been for six hours.

Before leaving the deck at eleven o'clock on the night of the 31st March, I observed that the weather was haze, and made it very difficult to see any distance.

The Captain remained on the side of the wreck

I feared that the Captain would drop off from exhaustion and fatigue.

Sawn to at Halifax in the }
County of Halifax this fifth }
day of April 1873 }
Before me
E. M. Macdonald

N. Brandt

John William Firth Linn
Examined by Mr. Blanchard

I was first officer of the Steamship
Atlantic.

At twelve o'clock of Monday the thirty
first day of March, ^{last year} I made an
observation myself, and upon comparing
it with the observation ^{made by} of the Captain
I found that we agreed as to the
Longitude, within one mile.

63°.55' Longitude West.

41°.39' North Latitude

after the reckoning was made, the
Captain called myself and the
Chief Engineer and ^{consulted} advised about
bearing up for Halifax - for ^{to obtain a supply of} coal,
where it was ^{unanimously} agreed that we should ~~have~~
~~up for Halifax~~ do so, as being the
safest and most sure means of getting
into a port.

at one o'clock the ship was headed
off to the North and the course set
for Halifax -

We steered a course of North
twenty four ^{degrees} East.

at noon she was going at the rate
of nine knots per hour -

I went to dinner and from that to
my room for the purpose of writing up
the day's work

I returned on deck at four P.M.
 my watch being from four to six.
 there was no alteration made in the
 course during my watch - the weather
 was fine, all sail furled, and
 yards squared. - I went below and
 at 6 o'clock I remained there from ~~six o'clock~~ ^{eight o'clock} ~~the~~
 eight o'clock. - There had been a
 change in the weather - between six
 and eight P.M. - at eight o'clock
 I came on deck to take the first
 watch. I remained in that watch
 until twelve o'clock. the course was
 not changed. - ~~the~~

At eleven o'clock the host of the
 dark clouds passed over and the
 weather became clear with light
 passing clouds.

about half past eleven we were going
 at ^{the rate of} twelve knots -

at twelve o'clock ~~the~~ previous to my
 going below the Captain informed me

At ten minutes to twelve the Captain
 joined me on the look out bridge
 and enquired for Mr Brady the third
 officer, as he wished to have the chestnut
 run by the ship from one ^{o'clock} P.M. until
 midnight. Mr Brady was, at this
 time going his rounds, ~~through the ship~~
 visiting the ship. Mr Brady ^{he} shortly
 afterwards returned and reported in the
 distance to the Captain. The Captain
 afterwards came on the bridge and

told me he placed the ship a little over forty seven miles from Lamber light. I was then relieved by the second officer. The orders from the Captain were to keep a good look out for loose ice and in the event of seeing a light if a fixed light to get it at least two points on the port bow and call him immediately. But under any circumstances to call him ^{these orders I conveyed to the second officer and} not later than three o'clock - I then went below

No soundings taken in my watch everything was ready to do so the leads were got ready in the afternoon

I was awakened from my sleep by the noise occasioned by the ship striking.

I at once proceeded to the deck taking with me a small boat axe which I had in my room.

I first arrived on the port side of the deck she was then heeling over where I found a number of men trying to clear away number six life boat - ~~it was scarcely cleared~~

They had scarcely got it clear ready for lowering when it was swept away by the sea. together with life boat number eight - I then crossed over to the starboard side of the ship to number seven life boat

that was scarcely clear when it shared
 the same fate. carrying with it a
 number of people ~~permanently~~. At this time
 the sea was making a clean break
 over the after part of the ship
 - she was heeled over to windward
 and seaward. exposing the whole
 of the ship's deck to the fury of the
 sea. I saw no ~~other~~ chance of
 getting away and therefore took to
 the mizen rigging, along with a
 great many more. At daylight I
 counted thirty two ^{men} including one ^{woman} ~~female~~
 I was. I remained in that position
 until two o'clock in the day, when
 I was rescued ~~from~~ by a boat
 crew in command of ^{the} Rev Mr
 Ancient. The woman who was in
 the rigging died about two hours
 before I was rescued - The majority
 of those who were with me in the
 mizen rigging and who tried to get
 forward to the rope which was ~~passing~~
 to the boat were drowned in the attempt.
 I was the last person on the wreck.

In answer to query by ~~George~~ by Mr Ritchie

He I have been fifteen years in
 packet ships, and the crew we had
 of the Atlantic were a fair average of the crews
 engaged in the Atlantic service

I do not think that it was possible
 to launch Mr 1 life Boat spoken of
 by Mr Allen.

Shortly after daylight the boat was

was carried away

The Captain exercised all the care and caution necessary - during the twenty seven years that I have followed the sea. I have not seen a better captain.

There could not possibly have been time to close the hatches or keep the stowage passengers down - both companion ways leading to the stowage were open.

am to question by ~~collecting~~ by the Mr. Cunningham

I am not able to say whether the ship had the quantity of coal

I am unable to say what quantity of coal she had on board when leaving Liverpool.

I am of opinion that

From what I ~~hear~~ ^{believe to be} of the ship's position at midnight - I considered that there was no risk in running the three hours

The ship's course was intended to take her five ~~degrees~~ miles east of Sumbur and the Strom at a point seven miles west of Sumbur light.

*

the was I can
I can only account for this fact is that
there was a strong current - setting to
northward & westward

I am not prepared to say from the
Ship's supposed position at midnight
whether she would be within soundings
not having examined the Ship's Chart

during my watch from 8 till 12 the
Ship was steering some course as
she had been for previous seven hours

I cannot say whether that course was
by the Captain made on my instructions
for current - made any allowance
for current - the course being shaped
by the Captain

The Log was regularly hove every two
hours

two or three drops during the passage
when we had no observation the dead
reckoning was found very correct

Given to at Walper in
the County of Kildare this
fifth day of April
1880 before me.

Wm Macdonald
Jr

John W. North
Chief Officer

Court adjourned at seven o'clock to
resume business on Monday morning
next at ten thirty AM

Charles J Macdonald
Clerk ~~Secretary~~ to Commission

Court adjourned at twelve thirty P.M.
to resume business at two thirty P.M.

Charles J. Macdonald
Clerk to Commission

Court resumed business at two thirty Pm
present Commission Mr Macdonald
Captain P. Scott and Geo McKenzie
when Mr Macdonald read and filed his
appointment - by order of the Governor
in Council

John Brown sworn
Examined by Mr Shannon

I was fourth officer of the S S Atlantic

I joined her at Liverpool on the voyage
before this one

The Captain directed me to alter the
course at one o'clock on Monday for
Halifax

I was not consulted as to changing the
course

We altered the course to north twenty
four East

We were running seven knots when
the course was altered

We had been reducing the consumption
of the coal and her speed came
down to seven knots

After we altered our course we began
to increase the consumption of the coal

By four the speed had increased
to eleven knots

My watch was up at four o'clock
after my watch I went below
and remained until six o'clock

When I came on deck at six o'clock
the course was the same and the
speed was the same

I remained on deck until eight
o'clock

at eight o'clock I went below

I came on deck again at twelve
o'clock

I relieved the third officer. the
Chief officer and Captain were on
deck

at twelve the third officer gave me
the course and directed me that if
any change in the weather or any
light seen to call the Captain at
once

the third officer then told me that the
distance to Sombro light was forty
eight miles

I had never been on the coast before

from one o'clock till midnight she had
run one hundred and twenty two miles

I threw the log myself at half
past one o'clock in the morning. by
the morning of the disaster
she was then going nine knots

her speed I think diminished from that time until the time that she struck.

at half past one the wind was about West North West.

a nice breeze was blowing. not a strong breeze

the leads were all on the bridge ready ^{and armed} the patent was set

we could have sounded in a minute they were not let go

I was on the Saloon deck the principal part of the time between half past one and the time she struck

there were two Quarter Masters on deck one at the Wheel and the ~~the~~ other along the wheel house

The Captain's boy came up at twenty minutes to three with a cup of Cocoa for him. the captain was then in the Chart-room

I told the boy not to call the captain until three o'clock. the boy then went to the second officer who was on the bridge. ~~he~~ told the boy that he would call the captain at-

48
49
Three o'clock

The second ^{officer} mate was on the bridge
all the time from twelve till three

Before I left the deck at fifteen minutes
before three, I went to the side of
the vessel (the port side) and I looked
in the direction where I expected to
see the light. I also looked from
the other side of the ship for the light.
I first went to the weather side three effects to sight

At that time it was cloudy with here
and there a peeping star and not thick

Four o'clock

I had got out of the after Stowage
cunning on deck when she struck

It was about a half an hour from
the time I left the deck until the
ship struck

I saw literally nothing but the open
sea until the ship struck

The Ship Struck Land

the Captain's boy is lost
the second officer is also lost

48
49
I did not let the boy go to the
Captain because I knew that

The Ship had not run her distance

The Ship was in charge of myself and
the ~~first~~^{second} officer

All the Officers of the Ship knew
that we were running in to make the
shore

No Quarter Master made any observation
~~on~~ to the second officer with reference
to running in to the shore - at least not
that I heard

One of the Quarter Masters (Thomas)
asked me at two o'clock, whether
he had not better go to the main
yard to see if he could see the
light. I said no it is too soon

It was not my duty to give him permission
to go to the main yard

I did not report that to the second officer

~~However~~ The Quarter Master went to the
wheel

The way I account for her speed coming
down from Eleven to nine knots was
that they must have been clearing out
the bunkers - or perhaps burning back coals

In going nine knots we would have
longer time to look for the light than
when going eleven knots

The lookouts were on for one and two hours and one man on bridge on the opposite side from the officer

We did not hear the noise of the breakers on the shore before we struck

I can give no reason why we did not hear the boat on the shore.

I left the ship about nine o'clock on Tuesday morning. I have not been down to the wreck since Wednesday morning when I left in the steamer

I saw that we must have passed ~~within~~ a good mile off pennant point

Lombro light if it should ~~show~~ ^{show} so far could be seen from pennant point

~~The~~ & I would have been in the steering when the vessel passed pennant point

The two quartermasters second officer and lookout party were on deck

The anchors were over the bows and made ready during the afternoon

They were made ready to come into berth

I did not believe that we had run on forty eight miles

I had no knowledge of the coast-
I knew how far Sombre light should
have been seen

In my opinion there was no reason
why we did not see Sombre light-
The weather was such as that we
ought to have seen it all I can
say is that we did not see it-

I have been going to sea ten years,

I have been an officer of a ship for
three years and a half.

I had a Certificate I got it in
Liverpool. Certificate as Master
I got it before going the Atlantic
My certificate is lost.

There were no orders given to prevent
the passengers getting on deck. There
was nothing done to prevent them.

When ship struck the Captain came
out once on deck

The Captain did all he could do
to save the passengers before he left
the wreck

I left the wreck before the Captain

The Captain was very much exhausted when
we came on shore
I left the scene of the disaster on Wednesday

I heard nothing about stopping the ship or
leaving her to when approaching the land
No person said anything about leaving
the lead.

The ship was
2376 tons registered
420 feet long
40 feet beam
30 feet depth of hold

~~There were nine hundred and forty passengers~~

The crew numbered 146 excluding
the stowaways

X 94 of the crew have been saved

We did not leave the lead on account
of the darkness of the night and the
certainty of seeing the light.

I cannot tell why we did not see the
light.

I should think that the vessel was
afloat at the stern. I do not think
that she was aground fore and aft.

52 Ans - Given by Mr Ritchie

Q 8

The reason I left the deck during my
watch was to perform my duties below

inspecting the Steerage

I returned on deck as soon as my duties were finished below

The door between the Chart-room and wheel house was open until ~~two~~ a little before two o'clock. the captain got-up and closed it-

From where I stood on deck was only two or three steps distant from the Captain -

The Captain was within six feet of the man at the ~~helm~~ wheelhouse within call from the Bridge. "even if the Chart-room door was shut-

We had a middling crew as good, as the generality

The Ships crew worked well if there was any trouble it was with the Stevedores

I found the Captain and Officers very attentive and all that any one could wish

Examined by ~~Examination~~ by ~~both~~ ^{Commission}

The Superior Officers of the ship were temperate men without exception

I never knew any of the officers of the ship indulging in wine drinking or card playing

It is decidedly untrue that the Captain was engaged in card playing a half an hour before she struck

At twenty minutes to three I felt very confident that the ship had not run her distance

I did not think that there was any danger of there being any mistake in the calculation or that she had overrun her distance

Under the circumstances ^{of sea and wind and} the condition of the ship on that night twelve or thirteen knots would be considered a fair rate of speed

~~When~~ We considered that she did not make that speed because when we bore up for danger she was only going seven knots and did not get over eleven knots during the night

Under the same condition of wind and sea. the same number of revolutions of the Engine will not always give the same rate of speed

We did not consider it necessary to
compare the Engineers Estimate of
Speed

The Ships Officer does daily compare
the ships log with the revolutions
We do not take it as a price

I sworn to at Stulager in }
the County of Stulager this }
seventh day of April }
A.D. 1873 Before me }
Emmercedmuller }

John Brown

William Hogan sworn

Examined by Mr Shannon

I was a Steerage passenger by the Steam
Ship Atlantic

The night before the disaster I went to
bed about nine o'clock

I went to bed ^{I heard five bells which I take as} under half past two

I was in the forward Steerage on the
lower deck

About ten minutes after five bells I
went up on deck near the Engine room

Every thing was as usual -

night was extremely cold

the weather I thought was very fair
better than it had been before

at six bells I went down again - the watch
called out three o'clock before I went
down stairs. before I went down I looked
out over the side of the vessel

It was partly for that purpose that I
came up I thought that about that
time they would be casting anchor

I looked out on the starboard side I
think it was. the side I afterwards
found out to be nearest the land
the sea was light the vessel was
running smooth at the time.

I heard nothing.

I had scarcely settled myself in the

back to sleep - it was about ten or
 fifteen minutes after I went down.
 Almost instantly after lying down I heard
 a fearful crash over the air rushed
 in blew out the lights and upset some
 of the bunks - Steerage passengers appeared
 to be stupefied with the shock. I
 awakened several of them up - they did
 not seem to understand that they were
 in extreme danger - While waiting for a
 companion of mine (Mr Lacey) - I looked
 out of the port hole - I saw the rock
 distinctly at first I thought it was
 the boiler head bursted, but after
 looking out of the port hole I told them
 that we were on a rock - Me and
 my companion made our way to the
 upper deck. Second deck. I do not
 know how we got up I think the
 stairs were broken down by the
 concussion. I made for the companion
 way and there I found a large
 crowd trying to get out. Some of
 the passengers below on the deck below
 cried out that the doors were closed
 but I think myself that they had
 made such a rush for the deck that
 they had wedged one another there
 I found it very hard to get out of the
 door. I positively believe that more
 would have been saved if the means
 of exit had been more ample.
 I came up through the companion way
 I went to the side of the vessel
 nearest to the land. This was

about- for minutes after she struck
 at this time I was near the feller door
 by this time the steam commenced
 to blow off, which made the land and
 everything around invisible. for some
 time for three or four minutes
 I don't think that the boilers bursted for
 I was near at the time

I found that the vessel had commenced to
 heel over. I caught a rope and got on the
 side of the vessel. she turned gradually
 for about half a minute, and then turned
 suddenly over.

All who had not hold of the rail or
 rigging were drowned.

I stopped on the side of the ship until the
 boats came and took me off

The officers and crew that I saw while on
 the side of the ship acted as good men
 ought to act

in answer to question by E. M. Macdonald Esq. Compt

I went up on deck because of a rumour
 I had heard among the passengers that we
 were to arrive about that time

I did not hear any of the officers of the ship
 make any remark as to what time we
 expected to be in Halifax

Given to at Halifax in the County
 of Halifax this seventh day of April
 1873. Before me
 the same having been first read over
 and explained

E. M. Macdonald

William ^{his} Hogan
 master.

Wm Hogan

59
60
Joseph Carroll sworn

Examined by Mr Shannon

I was an A B Seaman on board the
S S Atlantic

I went on the look out at two o'clock
on Tuesday morning.

I was stationed on number one house
forward of the bridge

I was the foremost man of the lookouts

It was a calm night. it was a little
hazy I perceived it was snowing a bit
What wind there was was right - a beam
from where I was standing I could
look out both sides of the vessel

I was looking out for a light. was
expecting to make a light but saw
none

I knew that we were going to make the
land

I have been in the port of Halifax before
about four years ago

I knew it was a dangerous coast.
I remained on number one house until
about twenty minutes past three when
the ship struck

She was going pretty fast. Smooth water
I suppose she was going ten knots

Before the ship struck I saw the breakers
and land on the starboard bow

59
I saw the breakers before I saw the land

61
I saw the breakers about eight or nine minutes before the ship struck

When I first saw the breakers I sung out Breakers ahead - to the second officer on the Bridge

I did not hear the breakers until I saw them

the wind was off the land

The first idea I had of approaching the land was when I saw the breakers

I do not know what was done on the Bridge when I sung out Breakers ahead

I was

My position was about thirty yards distant from the Bridge - it might be more

I am sure that my cry of Breakers ahead was heard by the officer on the Bridge the second officer

I should think that it was more than half a mile from the shore when I first saw the breakers.

60
I do not know if Engines were stopped but ship had way enough on her to carry her on the rocks even if Engines had been
+2
continued

Stopped

I never spoke to the second officer during the time I was on the look out

The first word I had with him was when I sung out breakers ahead

I was on the house within five minutes after she struck

In reply to question by Mr Macdonald Esq.
Commsr

When I went on duty that night I received the regular orders

After I left the look out when I found the ship heeling over. I went out to help clear away number five boat on the starboard side

After the wreck the officers and crew attended to their duties as far as they possibly could do so

The house on which I was standing is about eight fathoms from the stem of the ship

Sworn to at Belfast in the
County of Belfast this seventh
day of April 1887 J. D.
Before me.

the same having been
first read over and

explained

John Macdonald

Joseph ^{his} Carroll
mar

Patrick Kelly sworn

Examined by Mr Shannon

I was an A B Seaman on board the
S.S. Atlantic

I was on the bridge with the second
officer I went on the bridge at two
o'clock

I was in the Starboard side of the ship
I was there as a look out

When about ten minutes on the Bridge
the second officer told me to keep a
good look out for a light on the
Starboard bow.

I could see all ~~only~~ along the starboard
side

I kept a good look out for the sake
of my own life I had been thirty
years at sea

I did not see any light until
about a quarter after three and
then I saw the breakers

I have been on the coast frequently
I had been ~~here~~ in the Canada line

I was here last May

Kelly

I knew that it required great caution
the night was very dark.

When I first saw the breakers I called
out breakers or ice ahead - The
Quarter Master jumped up and he
asked me what I thought it was
I said Breakers or ice then the
Quarter Master sang out to the
Leaves Officer, and the Second
officer sang out full power astern

As near as I can judge the ship
was about a quarter of a mile
from the breakers ^{when I first saw them} She struck in
~~four~~ three or minutes afterwards

I cannot tell whether the Engines
were reversed.

The Second Officer pulled the telegraph
and called out full power astern

I do not know what the speed of the ship
was

I did not even hear the breakers

was announced by Mr Ritchie

I came on deck at twelve

it was very dark

at two o'clock when I went into
the bridge there was a slight
slut or snow it lasted for

am here.

I do not know of the Captain being
collected.

When I first saw the breachers I saw
them distinctly

I did not see the land only the breachers

In reply to question by Immaculatus & Conings

I did not hear Carroll give the alarm

Lived to at Hales in the Patrick Hiley
County of Hales this
seventh day of April 1873

Before me

Immaculatus

Charles William Poylance. sworn

Examined by Mr Blanchard

I was Quarter Master on board the
L^d Attentive

I was on duty in the after wheel
house on Tuesday morning.

There are 6 Dr Masters -

one Quarter Master is kept in the after
wheel house. for the purpose of the
rendering assistance in case the
Steam Steer's gear get out of order

I went into the wheel house at twelve
o'clock

I remained there until seven or eight
minutes before the ship struck

I was then standing looking out of one
of the windows of the wheel house when
I fancied that I saw breakers.
I then ran forward to the Bridge
and asked the man on the look out
if he did not think that there were
breakers. I saw them more distinctly
than I did in the after wheel house,
being higher up. - The look out-
man said he did not know
whether it was ice or breakers

I then gave the alarm to the second officer. he immediately pulled the telegraph signal. and the ship struck while he yet held his horn on the signal

At half past one she was going at nine knots. that was when the log was hove at three bells

I cannot say whether the Engines were reversed

It was about seven minutes from the time I first saw the buoys until she struck

Cross Examined by Mr Ritchie

It was a thick night sleeting

When we hove the log at three bells sleet was falling

I saw no light

Sworn to at Sturges this 2 Charles W^{his} Roylance
7th day of April as }
1873. Before me }
some having been first }
read over and explained }
J. H. Macdonald

Court adjourned at- six o'clock Pm
to resume business at- seven thirty
Pm

Charles J Macdonald
Clerk Secretary to Commission

Court resumed business at seven
thirty P.M. present - Commissioner
Captain Scott and MacKenzie

John Speakman sworn.

Examined by Mr Beauchamp

I was Quarter Master of the L S Atlantic
Race made nine voyages in her

on Monday night I left the after wheel
home where I had been on duty
from 8 till 12

My duty was to stand by in the
after wheel home in case of accident.

When I left I gave Royleance instruction
as to where the leads and night-
signals were

I was out-of wheel home from eight
to twelve know nothing of the ships
speed or the weather during that time

I turned in at twelve o'clock

The first I knew of the accident
was that I heard the ship strike

I went on deck and got a lamp from
the forward wheel home, and ran
aft and got the sockets. I fired
about eight when one burst in my
hand and I could fire no more

I went forward and assisted in
getting the line forward to the rock

I swam to the rock with the line
 Cross Examined by Mr Ritchie

The present screw is very poor. her
 average speed varied from Eleven
 to thirteen ^{knots} with every thing favorable

Ever since I have been in her I have
 given her a little over what she made
 that is over what the log indicated

After we have up-
 t-one o'clock she
 went very fast
 much faster than
 she had done for
 a day or two

She went very fast much faster than
 she had done before. that is from noon
 when we bore up.

Presum, I could
 not understand why
 we did not then know
 that they had been
 sure could more
 truly

Quarter Master Owens attended the log
 at half past nine. I am not sure
 of what he gave in I think it was
 thirteen knots

Quarter Master Owens is alive and
 is now at the wreck

~~xxxx~~ ^{we} used to put it down on a slate
 and report it to both officers on
 watch

Quarter Master Purdy ^{threw} ~~threw~~ the log
 at half past nine and Owens must
 have thrown it at half past eleven

When I saw the front mark near
 the wheel house. I cannot say
 whether that was correct, as
 some times the line will run

out-after the case 'Stop'

down to at Halifax in
the County of Halifax
this seventh day of
April 1858 13
Before me

John Speakman

John Macdonald

Robert Thomas Sworn

Examined by Mr Shannon

I was Quarter Master of the S S Atlantic and was on duty from midnight until she struck -

The officers ^{on deck} were Mr Melcal the second officer and Mr Brown the fourth

My duty ^{for the first two hours} was to make the Coffe for the officers & clean the Brass work in the forward wheel house

I went down got the Coffe and gave it to the officers, relieved the man at the wheel and let him have his Coffe. I then

at half past one I went to the second officer. I made the remark at the time that to ^{him} the second officer that I thought the ship ~~should~~ had run her distance, far enough to make Lombo light - and that she would lay with her head off shore I made that remark because I had got the latitude and longitude of the ships position at one o'clock and ^{also at same time} had got the latitude and longitude of Halifax (Capeaul) from one of the Salmon passengers, and had made the calculations myself.

I estimated that the ship would go Eleven Eleven and a half and twelve knots - without allowing anything for set of current -

at this time I thought that we had run far enough to see Lumber light

Witness here repeats the language used to second officer and here give some second officer reply
"that he was not Captain and I was not mate and he could not do as he wished

at this time the second officer and the Boatswain's mate were standing on the port side of the Bridge.

At two o'clock I went to the wheel and saw the fourth officer Mr Brown at the Starboard wheel house door I asked him ^{him} if I could go up on the main yard and look out for the Lamer

Mr Brown told me it was of no use the ship had ^{not} run the distance

I felt uneasy when called out twelve o'clock on learning from Purdy that the light was not in sight -

When Mr Brown told me that we had not run the distance

72
74
I said that I could pick up the
canal better than any other man
as I had been on the coast before.

I was here in 1865 we called here
for coals in the City of London.
I know the canal about Lambro
to be low.

I told the first officer that he
could not feel the canal until he
struck on it.

When I spoke to Mr Brown I took
a look ahead but could see no
light. If I had looked a little
east and gone aloft I dare say
I might have picked it up.

I was at the wheel when vessel struck.

At three o'clock the weather began
to set a little thick. The Captain
Bry came up to give the Captain
his order. The second mate said
never mind calling him I will call
him myself in a moment.
At twelve minutes past three the
Captain was called, but that he
was not properly aroused
by the second officer when first called.

72
The Chart-room door

The door to the Chart-room where
the Captain was lying down was

73
75
from eighteen to twenty four inches
from my back.

there was a clerk in the wheel
house and I knew the exact-
time at which the Captain was
called.

The second mate went outside the
door for a minute or two after
he had called the Captain.
he came in again and opened the
Captains door, and so I said
to the second officer the best-thing
to do is to go in and shake the
man so as to get him up.
at this time the man at the look
out-forward - (Carroll) called out -
what I supposed to be ice
ahead.

I ran outside to see whether it was
the ice. got back to the wheel
again when the ship struck.

I could see the white foam I thought
we had got amongst. full ice.

I put my helm hard a starboard
ran to the telegraph to the Engines
which was underneath the bridge.

at this time the second officer and
the Captain were coming out of the
wheel house after me.

73
134
I went to the Engines to telegraph
to reverse Engines so as if it

was filled ice we might not
 slow our bows in
 I then ran to the after wheel house

She ^{had} struck just ^{when} ~~as~~ I went going
 to telegraph

I do not know whether the Engines
 were reversed

I then went to after wheel house
 for the six axes, for purpose
 of cutting the grapes of the boats

When I am aft a young woman
 named Mamey called out, "Robert
 save me" I told her to wait there
 until I come back, which I did
 when I got the axes, I took her and
 the boy and another young woman
 on the saloon deck, I left them
 there and threw the axes all some
 way on the saloon deck - when I
 heard Mr. Bracey call out where
 is the axes - I swung out to him
 that they were all distributed
 out - I went and cut away the
 after port boat and the after
 Harbour boat grapes ~~away~~
 she then lifted over
 surely the Quarter Reaster was with
 me at the time
 he said to me Thomas are you
 going to swim ashore with me

25 7
I said I'm not left as I went
to leave the Boy and his Mother
he wished me "Good bye" Sunday
was the first man that left the
ship for the shore. when he got
into the water he was swept away
by the large trunks the rock that
was forward.

After I had seen Mary Mowry
and her boy gone I thought it
was time for me to leave the
ship myself. I pulled off my
gumsey frock and coat and
sea boots. I ran down her side
with the end of a line and swam
to the shore - this was before
daylight

was examined by Mr Ritchie

at twelve o'clock at night. I allowed
that we had run one hundred and
fifty four miles from one o'clock

At twelve o'clock the wind seemed
inclined to the Southward.

at two o'clock the wind was varying
sometimes on the port-Quarter and
sometimes astern.

76
at two o'clock in the morning the
wind was to the Southward

At Midnight - while Lull was on
there was only the Boatman's Mate
and the Second Officer on the
port-side and another look out
on the Starboard side of the
Bridge. The Boatman's mate is now lost.

At twelve minutes past-three the
Second Officer came down to call
the Captain. He told the Captain
that the weather was getting thicker
and he could not see anything
of Lamber Light-

The Captain was not properly
awakened the first-call

The Second Officer went-out-and
returned in two or three minutes
He then opened the door, and
called the Captain again. He
came out-when the man on the
look out-called out-see or
breakers ahead - He had then
been in about-a minute -
after ringing out-he returned and
told Captain Williams we are
among the ice

The Captain ran out-when she struck

When the Second Officer went-back to
tell the Captain of the ice. I went-
outside myself and looked and
saw the breakers

I took the wheel again and then
I felt the jar

The second officer and the Captain
were both in the Chart-room
when she struck

I am sure the second officer was
with the Captain in the Chart-room
when she struck

When the ship struck I sent my
lieutenant a steward, I then
ran to the telegraph under the Bridge
at that time I ~~was~~ did not notice
anybody on the bridge

When I went out the wheel house I at
first thought it was foul lee

When I asked the fourth officer if
I might go aloft, I looked ahead
for the light. I don't think I
saw more than two points on
each bow

I looked for Lombo light straight
ahead

I cannot say ~~what~~ how Lombo light
would bear. If we were fourteen
miles from the place we were wrecked
on the course we were steering

I heard Mr Brady call for the caps
he must have been on the Saloon Deck
I only heard his voice

75
80
I told him the axes were out

I did not see him I don't know if
he saw me

I think this was my fault voyage
in this ship

The ship would sometimes run thirteen
or thirteen and a half knots and
sometimes more

Without sail we consumed twelve
and a half to thirteen days well

at half past one I fancied that we
were seventeen or eighteen miles from
Lombro light

at one o'clock in the day I estimated
that we were from one hundred and
fifty five to one hundred and seventy
miles from Halifax, the estimate
I made, from the Coastwatcher and
Longitude I got from the Saloon
passenger

In reply to Embrocadura Esq. Commission

at half past one I suggested to the
second officer that it would be
prudent to lay her too

78
I thought as the light was not then
visible we ought to lay too
139

In 1865 when I was here before it seemed like a difficult coast to make out, the ship was standing off and on and sounding every ten minutes or quarter of an hour.

It was from my experience on that occasion, that I thought it imprudent to stand on as they were doing in the Atlantic on the night of the disaster.

After one o'clock and until the ship struck the weather was cloudy. I did not observe any sleet-falling.

She was not that night in a condition to make thirteen knots.

I don't exactly know. But I have heard that there is a current on this coast in the winter time running from two to three knots and sometimes four. I don't know in what direction it sets. From to out-Halifax.

in the County of Halifax

this Seventh day of April

A.D. 1873. Before me

Ammaeemmed

Robert Thomas

80
82
John Hopley Swann

Examined by Mr Shannon

I was Chief Engineer of the CS
Atlantic

I was not on duty in the ~~boat~~ first
day of ~~March~~ ^{April} at the time she ~~sunk~~

At 12 o'clock noon ^{day of} 31st March the
Captain sent Mr Ready there offi-
for my coal account - once issued
by the Engineer. I made it up and
took it to him. At that time
the Captain was in his Chart Room

The ~~printed~~ ^{order} ~~was~~ ^{written} ~~here~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{paper} ~~was~~ ^{delivered} ~~to~~ ^{by} ~~the~~ ^{some} ~~Statement~~
handed Captain on the evening 31st day of March
This Statement gives estimate number
of miles by the revolution for the
last 24 hours and ten minutes
the coal expended during that
time and the coal remaining - amounting
to a fraction over 127 tons
Coal consumed 80 tons

At 8 o'clock

I think the Captain said we were
48 or miles from Sandy Hook and that
~~and~~ there was a South West swell
and a falling glass

C1

and that we were about - 170 miles from Halifax. He then sent down for the Chief Officer Mr Fulk and told him what quantity of coals were on board and asked whether it be advisable to proceed on our voyage to New York or put the ship about for Halifax - Captain Mr Fulk - and I thought it better to put ship up for Halifax as the barometer was falling, and the ship was making such little head way thought the weather. He was informed that we might get within about eighty miles of Long Hook and the coals would be about expended at that time. After the ship was put about at one o'clock we commenced to clean more fires. Two more fires each watch so that we would be able to keep steamer steam on - from one o'clock up to midnight the ship was going a little faster through the water than what she was when we were headed for New York - At midnight I turned in I heard then struck eight bells before I fell asleep

Crossed by Mr Ritchie

At the time of the accident the fourth and fifth Engineers were on duty - they were on duty from twelve until the time of the accident -

The fifth Engineer was dismissed

We took on board at Liverpool .
847 tons of coal . there was
abt- 120 tons left from the voyage
before . making a total of 967
tons .

We had used about- eighty tons before
we left- . that left- 887 tons to
commence the voyage with

Some days we consumed over
seventy- tons ~~per day~~
the average consumption since leaving
Liverpool was 69 tons
it left us 128 tons

the reason of the consumption being so
heavy was that it was mixed
coals . English and Welsh

This was my seventeenth voyage
in this steamer

This was my second voyage as first-
Engineer - and I did not know her
consumption before I became Chief
Engineer

Last voyage we had seventy belmont-
12 and 1300 tons of coal when leaving
Liverpool . 13 days on the voyage
and had one hundred and twenty
nine tons when arriving at New York

With the ~~fast~~^{fast} she had on the last voyage the highest rate of speed we could attain was from 12½ to 13 knots in favorable weather and smooth water, without canvas.

I consider that her average rate of speed from the time we here up for Halifax was ten and a half knots.

The miles run as estimated by the revolution of the propeller cannot be depended upon.

Referring to the two last voyages we always burned Welsh coals, ^{I think properly that the consumption was about} I heard from the Chief Engineer say that the average ~~was~~ daily consumption was about - eight tons.

Sy

In reply to E. M. Macomber Esq. Commission

on the second last voyage the average daily consumption was between 68 and 69 tons - that voyage was about 14 days we had 129 tons remaining when we arrived at New York.

I consider that when we left Liverpool we had sufficient coal on board for a voyage at the steam of the beam.

If we had used a full supply of

coal it would probably have made a difference of one or one and a half knots more

When we tore up for Chesapeake her speed was about 8 knots

She was on her best speed between 10 and 12 ^{at night} by the revolution she made 14 knots

It was on account of the high price of coals in England that we put in a ~~large~~ ^{greater} quantity of coals on this last voyage than on the previous ones.

I remark it would be prudent to start from Liverpool with twelve days coal recommended by Mr Ritchie

It is my own opinion only not from any information obtained from agents that there was a smaller quantity of coal taken in on the passage from motives of economy

We kept a pressure of 54 lbs when running at her best rate. when at the reduced rate from 50 to 52.

The consumption of coals at the highest rate of pressure was 70 tons

at the reduced rate of pressure we consumed about 60 tons

25- 7
When we left the dock we have full
thirteen days consumption. but we
expended eighty tons before we
proceeded to sea, as we were laying
under steam for twenty four hours

The regular bunkers held seven hundred
and eight seven tons

Sworn to at Halifax in
the County of Halifax
this seventh day of
April 1873

Before me

Emmacedmalla

} John Hoxley

Eleven thirty P.M.

Court adjourned to resume business
on ~~Monday~~ Tuesday morning at nine
a.m.

Charles J. Macdonald
Clerk to Committee

Tuesday - April 8 1873

Court resumed at nine o'clock
a m. present - Commissioner and
Captain Scott and Mackenzie

William Pattison sworn

examined by Mr Shannon

I was fourth Engineer on board the SS Atlantic

I was on duty had charge of the Engine room from 12 to 4 in the afternoon and from 12 to 4 in the morning

I took charge of the Engine room at 12 o'clock on the night the ship struck and was on duty until she struck

~~At twelve o'clock when I went on duty the Engines were going slower than they had been for the 12 hours previous. They continued working slow until 2 o'clock - the speed~~

from twelve o'clock when I went on duty until 2 o'clock the Engines were working slower than they had been doing for the twelve hours previous they commenced to improve in speed about half past one

When the Engines are doing their best - we work about 54 lbs steam with expansion full open

between twelve and two o'clock the lowest pressure of steam reached was thirty six pounds, with the

expansion valve partly open closed on
at twelve o'clock at night when we
went on duty the gauge indicated a
pressure of steam of fifty pounds.

the steam getting down to thirty six pounds by the ^{gauge} ~~gauge~~
I account for that. because when I went ^{the} ~~the~~
on watch there were no coals on the
plates nor round coals left out to fire
up two fires after being cleaned. - the
fires were also a little low

It took me some little time to get
coals out for the fires. then a further
time to get out the round coals. to fire
up the fires after being ~~fixed~~ ^{cleaned} cleaned

We were increasing in speed from two
o'clock until three

At three o'clock I had fifty pound pressure
on the gauge - and at the time she
struck about fifty one -

The speed was increasing with the pressure

I was in the Stroke hole when she struck

I was standing on the stroke hole plates
when I operate number two boiler
when I felt the ship touch the bottom
^{I supposed} almost directly under my feet on
the starboard side of the keel -
as if she were graving over on something

At the time I was Surfacing number one
Starboard Boiler

I immediately shut the surface cock
and ran up to the Engine room
when I got there I saw the telegraph
had been thrown round beyond
the usual mark for going astern
full speed. as if it had been
pulled violently. The ~~to~~ It had
been answered from the Engine Room
and the fifth Engineer was in the act
of reversing the Engines
The fifth Engineer is not alive

James Denney the Greaser also since
dead was ~~also~~ on the platform in
the act of assisting him

I went to his assistance and from
the time I got on the platform until
the Engines were going astern would
occupy about a quarter of a minute

I watched the telegraph for a
short time for about half a minute
more to see if there were any
more signals from the deck.
I at some time looked at
Engine Clock and found it marked
minutes minute past three
I then gave the throttle valve handle
in charge of the fifth Engineer while I
went below to shut the surface
sea cock.

As soon as I got to the foot of the
 Engine room ladder the Engines
 went away with a race. That
 is they went away at great speed
 suddenly.

I turned the ~~f~~ about and called
 the fifth Engineer to stop her.
 I then proceeded to the Stroke hole
 and while ^{going} there heard her go
 away at another race. I turned
 about to see what was the matter
 and I saw the Chief Engineer in his
 shirt sleeves at the throttle valve
 handle. The Chief Engineer then
 stopped the Engine and ordered the
 fifth Engineer to shut the main stop
 valve. and he went himself to open
 the safety valve.

When I got to the Stroke hole there was
 nobody there -

The fireman's room was above the
 stroke hole and I called to the
 fireman to come down and attend
 their fires.

This all occurred in the space of two
 or three minutes. That is from the
 time she struck until I shut the
 sea cock.

While I was shutting the port - I saw
 the water running out of the sternmost
 after bunker.

I had only about twelve feet to run
 and before I reached the Engine room

there was a foot of water over the
store hole floor.

I then made my way to the deck being
the last person leaving the Engine
room

In reply to question by En Macdonald by Comms

She appeared to me as if her bottom was
going over the shore with a rumbling
noise, not as if she struck full against
a rock, and ^{that} from the time I first felt
the shock until the Engine went away
with a race was about two minutes

Had the ship been afloat and free I
would estimate that it would last
from three to five minutes from the
time the Engine had been reversed
until the ship would be going astern

Sworn to at Halifax } William Pattison
in the County of Halifax }
this eighth day of }
April A.D. 1873 }
Before me

En Macdonald

Cornelius L Brady. recalled

Examined by Mr Shamm.

I had a Certificate of Competency as Master, and also passed in Steam

I do not remember the date or number
I have had the Certificate about
five years.

My Certificate was left in England.
I have been in command of a Steam Ship sailing out of Long
Cross Examined by Mr Ritchie

Under the most favorable circumstances
the ship with the fan she had
and with fair wind and all sail
set would not attain a greater
speed than thirteen knots

On March twenty three the number
of miles run was three hundred, but
it was for twenty four hours and
thirty five minutes, and with a fresh
easterly gale and all sail set

I never saw Thomas nor heard him
from the time she struck until we
got on shore.

I went up to Clameys but to get
some of our own crew to assist me
I there saw Thomas in Clameys but

I know that the provisions were
inspected by the Government Immigration
Agent

The Chief Steward and Purser of
the Ship who would know about
the provisions are both dead

Suon to at-Haafy }
in the County of Haafy }
this eighth day of }
April AD 1873

C L Brady

Before me
Jm Macdonald

John W. Firth recalled

examined by Mr Sherrin

I have been Captain of a Steam Ship

My Certificate as Master dates from
May 1859.

The number I think is 20.489

The Certificate was on board the Atlantic
and is lost

Once I, by Mr Ritchie
during her last voyage she never averaged
during the passage out - she never averaged
thirteen knots. even with a fair wind
and all sail set.

on the day we ran 300 miles we had
all sail set and a fresh gale

the highest rate of speed ^{possible for her to attain} was thirteen knots

This was my second trip across the Atlantic
with Steam. my experience has been in the
Mediterranean & India Ocean

I think that 900 tons of Welsh Coal
would be equal to 1050 tons

Edward J. Mulligan sworn

Examined by Mr. Shannon

I am Master of the S S Carlotta

I have been Master of a steam ship upon this Coast for four years

I have during that time been running between Portland and Healds making weekly trips

The Carlotta is 549 tons burthen

I am familiar with the Coast of lower Portia from Cape Sabine to Healds

on March 31 st the night in which the Atlantic was lost I made Sombra light at ten o'clock by Portland time being about ten - twenty five Healds time

I think Sombra light bore about North East by East distant about four miles as I judged

It was a very disagreeable night - a dark thick night - the wind was South East up to between eight and nine o'clock when being very hard and unsettled weather

after nine the wind changed to West South West with some fog and drizzling

Towards twelve the weather improved

I think that Sombro light-out twelve o'clock ought to have been seen at a greater distance than at ten. But the weather might have been different than from what I have it coming up the harbor

I got in Halifax Harbor about one o'clock

As I come up the harbor I made the lights: Chebucto Head, Devils Island, and Treasons Beach

I was steering East North-East when I made Sombro light.

I was not smoking when I made the light.

The currents

I don't think the current set in the same direction for twenty four hours at a time they are governed a great deal by the wind. In winter time we appear to have a stronger westerly current than what we have in the summer time

A Son of the Spirit that is coming in from the Sea there would be a better opportunity of seeing the light than ^{when} ~~at~~ sailing along the coast.

We have no more difficulty on that night than we ordinary, in making the land

I pinned myself to the near Sombra
 Had I not got the light would have showed
 the ship would have been head off shore
 just before I got the light. I was in the
 act of slowing my ship, when I got hold
 of the light. I would not have succeeded because the
 soundings are very irregular about Sombra

I use Brasses Patent log on board my ship

My speed when I saw Sombra light was
 about ten knots

We run the log in all weathers - we find
 the Patent log very satisfactory

I use the log at all times, irrespective of
 the weather. We haul our log from light
 to light, and we always find it satisfactory
 but I never consider it safe to run to the
 last mile the log would allow but
~~under~~ always allow a margin

I prefer the patent log

I use the Common lead,
 coming to the Eastward in thick weather
 I always use the lead

Cross by by Mr Ritchie

I do not use the lead in clear weather

The last light previous to Sombra light-
 which I mean was Little Hope light-
 house - I passed it about four
 o'clock

When I was going to show the Steamer

I knew that I was near Sombro

Sombro light is a very treacherous light to depend upon as to distance

our deck is about eighteen or twenty feet high from the water. Sombro light can be seen in fine weather about twelve miles

In going up to the Mast-head about thirty feet higher, we could make it out probably three or four miles further

so examined by Mr Blanchard

When coming up I was in the Pilot House. I make it a rule to always stay in the Pilot House from the time we make Sombro Island light to Halifax

At Sea in rough weather I think Messrs Patent log has a tendency to show more miles than are actually made

I heard no guns from Sombro that night

Swon to at Halifax in E D Mulligan
the Comdr of Halifax }
the Eighth day of }
April AD 1873 }
Before me }

J. H. Macdonald

Tuesday one. thirty Pm
Court adjourned to meet for business
on Thursday at 11 Am.

Charles J Macdonald
Clerk to Commission

Thursday. April 10th 1873

In consequence of the following note
having been received from Esq -
Macdonald Esquire the Commissioner
the Court stood adjourned. to meet
for business on Saturday the twelfth
instant at 10.30 Am

Charles J Macdonald
Clerk to Commission

Copy of letter

Custom House. Halifax
Wednesday. April 9. 73

Charles J Macdonald Esq
Sir

As I am compelled to visit
Prospect and the scene of the wreck of
the Atlantic on business connected
with the Customs. the Court of Enquiry
will not sit in Halifax on Thursday
the tenth instant as per adjournment
but will meet instead on Saturday
the tenth instant at half past ten Am the
Yours will please command

notice of this adjournment to be made
public through the press

Yours truly

Edm Macdonald

Halifax N.S.

April 12. 1873

Court resumed business on Saturday
the twelfth at ten thirty a m
present - The Commissioners Captains
Scott and McKenzie

Court resumed on Saturday April 12. 1873.
 at ~~ten~~^{ten thirty} o'clock A.M. present - Commissioner
 Captain Lovett and Geo MacKenzie
 Edward Owens sworn

Examined by Mr Shannon
 I was Quarter Master on board Lt Atlantic

I joined the ship four days before she left
 on this voyage

When the ship struck I was in my bed

I was relieved and went below at 12 o'clock

Before I went below I heard Mr Brady
 give orders to keep a sharp look out
 for the light. - Lumber light.

Quarter Master Thomas Rynlaenel
 and Williams were on deck went - I
 went below.

Williams is lost

My place from ten to twelve was near
 the lee ^{side of the} wheel house - leads were
 all prepared and coiled - there was
 one deep sea lead with a spare line
 to bend on.

The patent sounding apparatus was all
 ready.

I ~~threw~~^{hove} the log at half past eleven

the ship was then going Eleven Knots

Purdy gave the log between half past-
nine and ten

When I went below the ship was steering
North East by North half North

The fastest I have seen this ship run
during the voyage was thirteen to thirteen
and a half knots. then we had a
strong Easterly gale behind us. with
all sail set.

She would not run that for four
or five hours consecutively

I went from the ship to the rock
with the rope

About fifty fathoms got from the rock
to the shore before I left it

I was on the rock assisting the passengers
to the main land

I last saw Thomas on the rock when
I reached it. he then left it for
the main land.

When I reached the main land I

Unarmed and assisted the passengers from the vessel onto the boat.

Thomas did not remain about the vessel to assist passengers land; he left shortly after I arrived on the main land.

I was Quarter Master in Allens employ for seventeen voyages in the West India.

I have also been Quarter Master in the Indian employ.

In both the Allens and the Indian employ they use the common log.

They have Brasses, patent log on board the S.S. Atlantic.

I have seen them used in Indians employ.

The average rate of speed during my watch from ten to twelve was from ten and a half to eleven knots.

She had been going about the same the afternoon previous.

I cannot say what rate of speed she was going at half past six.

Recommended by Mr. Blanchard without sail she would make about

nine knots

I was in this Harbour with the Peruvian

I can't not know what land we were
making the night she struck

We had a great deal heavy sea wind
during the voyage.

In reply to question of Commission

We bore up for Halifax Eleven days
after leaving Liverpool

I cannot say what the average rate of
speed would be previous to our bearing
up for Halifax

At one o'clock when we bore up I think
we were about 170 miles from land light

I have been here three times before

When I have the log on that night—
showing my watch the highest rate of
speed was Eleven knots

The distance being 170 miles when we
bore up for Halifax, over the time
occupied in running it 14 hours and ten
minutes. I cannot say what the average
rate of speed would be for that time

110
If the distance from the place where she
bore up for Hades was as I heard
it (170), the speed of Eleven Knots-
an hour would have carried her to
within seven miles of the shore.

Crossed by the Pilot

I am not understood Cyprian to day.

In reply to questions by the Commission

I understand navigation

I work navigation as far as second mate
work but do not understand Cyprian

I have not possessed the house

I am at Hades
in the center of
Hades the 12th
day of April
1873

Before me

Wm. M. Mendenhall

E. W. Mendenhall

Peter Coffin sworn
Examined by Mr. Shannon.

I have been a Ship Master. I commanded
a ship 35 years ago

I have been on board the Commodore
Steamers as pilot for some twenty five
years

I always went on board the Commodore
Steamers when they arrived here and
continued pilot on the voyage from
Newport to Boston and Back

I ceased to be a pilot for the Commodore
Steamer, about about the end of 1888-1867
when the Commodore contract expired

I am familiar with the coast of Rhode Island
and with the light house ^{probably} around the coast
as much as any man could be.

I am familiar with Pombo light.

I don't think there has been any change
made with Pombo light since I left off
piloting. There was a change made before
I left.

We used to make Pombo light at from 16
to 18 miles ~~before~~ distance. from the paddle
Box of the Steamer when coming from the
Westward. when nearing the light. Sometimes
when we got within ~~about~~ six or eight.

miles from it. It would not appear so bright as it would at 12 miles distance.

I believe these Steamers in all weathers

I never found any difficulty in seeing the light when the horizon was clear.

I never passed Sombro light at night time without seeing it. If the night light was not visible I would not run

I have the evidence heard the evidence here. and in my judgment. I think that there was a mistake made in the reckoning of the horizon. the horizon is sometimes deceptive - on one occasion I run for Sombro light intending to pass three miles south of it - the horizon appeared well defined. I saw nothing of Sombro light - until we ^{first} saw the Island on which stands the light house - square on the beam. and even when I saw the land I could not for some time see the light. owing to the fog settling down until it had obscured the light.

I would not have attempted to run in on that occasion

I never would venture to run up to Halifax Harbour during the night until I saw Sombro light - unless in case of emergency

I am somewhat familiar with the
currents in this coast-

I do not think that the current vary
so much with the seasons of the year
as they do with the tides. I think
the ^{westerly} currents prevail more from March to
June than during any other time of the year.

I don't know of a north westerly current
prevailing during the month of March.

I have found a current from half a
knot to a knot and a half.

In coming from the Brazil rock to ^{San Juan} Pombro I used to allow an half a knot
for a westerly current - sometimes I would
find more.

I found on one occasion in a sailing ship
just before an Easterly gale. a strong
current - setting in a north by north-
west - direction - from Pombro light towards
St. Marguerite Bay. close in shore.

I have never found that current more
than perhaps three miles from the shore.

I have never experienced any current
so strong as would have set that
S. S. Atlantic so far out of her course.

Sometimes with a southerly wind we would frequently find an on shore set -
under other circumstances when we would get the land off shore - more particularly near St-Marguerite Bay we would get the current off shore.

On board the Comard Steamer when it was thick weather we paid a great deal of attention to our sounding. If there was any doubt about the hazy being steered we always used the lead.

I never observed any ^{difference in the appearance of Sombra Light} distant approach from sea than ^{when} ~~from~~ approach from the East or West.

Ans. Giovanni By Mr. Ritchie

In approaching Nalajit Harbour, I had no occasion to cross this current any distance from the shore. I always came from the Westward.

In shaping my course for Sombra Light when about 160 miles ^{to} ~~from~~ the Southward I think that seven or eight degrees Easterly deviation would be sufficient to allow for the set of current.

~~If the night ^{might} was clear - that is if we saw the light - we would not sound~~
If the night appeared to be clear and we had no doubts about the horizon we would not sound.

on two occasions we saw the flash
of the guns from Sombro although we
could not see the light nor hear
the guns. on those occasions the horizon
was thick the fog very low and the
stars visible the flash being about
mid-

On the occasion I referred to seeing
Sombro by Islander before seeing the
light I was at a distance of from
two and a half to three miles from
it

recommenced by the Shamrock.

On a clear night the Comet would be
seen at about six miles distance
It is quite uncertain at what distance
the boat would be seen

Line to St. Helier
is the only of which
the 12 day of April
AD 1873 before

Peter Coffin

Shamrock

William Eulke Sworn
 Examined by Ben Shannon

I am Keeper of Sable Light. Have
 been Keeper for 27 years

I recollect the night of March 31
 and morn of April 1st, the light
 was very bright. I attended to it
 at 10 o'clock March 31 and at 2
 o'clock on the morn of April 1.

At 10 o'clock the wind was South South
 west - very heavy, and heavy
 once a heavy sea running

At 10 o'clock we fired 2 guns
 at 2 o'clock in the morn of April the
 first the wind was not so strong and
 blowing from the West-South west, but
 it was very heavy. I could just
 distinguish Chubnet's Beacon light -
 distance about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles - and
 fired 2 guns again. There was a
 heavier sea running at 2 o'clock than
 at 10 - At 3 o'clock the fog began
 to clear away and there were a
 few stars visible the wind was
 then west and afterward it landed
 in to North west and blew heavier
 I was on duty at 3 o'clock. The
 sea was very heavy at 3 o'clock

Sworn to at 12 o'clock

in the custody of Henry }
 the 12th day of Apr 1873 }

Before me

Ben Shannon

William Eulke

George Meade Surge
 Ensigned by the Surgeon

I belong to the Royal Artillery. Am an
 Gunner. Am stationed at Soudby
 Island as Signaller. My duty is
 to report the Steamers passing at night
 and sailing vessels in day time. To
 fire signal guns when heavy guns at
 sea. or fog horn. or seeing any lights
 we fire 2 guns in response
 we fire guns on foggy nights.

I fired 2 guns at 10 o'clock on the
 night of March 31st. The guns were
 fired because of the fog - I fired
 2 guns again at 2 o'clock on the
 following morning for the same reason
 The light was being bright during all
 the time I was on duty.

I was on duty from midnight
 till six in the morning

The weather at 3 o'clock was a
 little brighter.

At 2 o'clock it was very hazy

Surge to at Soudby } R Meade
 in the City of 184
 the 12 day of
 Apr 1873 }
 Before me
 Jm Macdonald

Edward Johnston Sum
 Re by Mr Thomson

I am Keeper of the Light at Chiswick Head
 I recollect the night of 31 March and
 morning of April 1st -

About 11 at night the wind was
 west-south-west weather very
 dark and rainy.

At three o'clock in the morning I saw
 Lamber light and Beacon Beach light
 weather was much clearer

at 11 o'clock I could not see Lamber
 light.

Chiswick Head light was very
 brightly

I did not observe Lamber light
 before 3 o'clock

Sum to Mr Hargreaves } Edward Johnston
 in the County of Hants }
 the 12 day of Apr
 1873 before me
 R. M. M. M.

Court adjourned at 3 o'clock P.M.
to resume business on Monday next -
the 14 inst at 2.30 P.M.

Charles J. Macdonald
Clerk to Commissioner

Went to 28 Monday Apr 14 1873

Court resumed business at
2 30 P.M. present - The
Commissioner. Captains
Scott and MacKenzie

Bergoni Lighthouse
 Is by Mr. Shannon

I am Keeper of Lewis Island Light-
 and have been Keeper for the past ¹⁷~~18~~ years

I was on duty at 9 & 11 o'clock on the
 night of March 31 once again on duty
 at 3 o'clock on the morning of April
 the first

My light is supposed to be visible
 4 to 10 miles

The first part of the night was clear
 at 9 o'clock I could see Sombra Light
 and Chibnash Head Light

At 11 o'clock it was thicker hazy
 and with rain showers. I could see
 Chibnash Head but not Sombra Light

At 3 o'clock it was clear I could
 see Sombra and Chibnash Head lights

Distressingly thin fog from the westward
 My light was in perfect good order all night
 My light might have been visible some
 7 or 8 miles that is on these occasions
 I have never above as long on duty

Before I became light-house keeper
 I was in the Revenue Cutter with Captains
 Deady and Seely and afterwards in
 the Coast Survey Service with Captains
 Shuttleworth and Scott. I first entered
 the revenue Service in 1837

I am familiar with the lights along
this coast-

I could not say how far Lombo light
might have been visible in that ocean
as they might have it three days or
8 miles off while we had it for

The currents along the coast according
to my judgment are irregular I have
found a stronger westerly current during
the month of April very rare here

I have never logged the currents-
they may perhaps run at half or
1 knot - perhaps more

The currents generally run best South-
West and South West-

I have never found a northerly set - the
currents sometimes 50 or 60 miles from
beach will run about North West-
for a few hours perhaps 4 or 5 hours

I have found it there a northerly set
of a knot over a half I have found
that as far as 60 miles from Lombo

I have found a little northerly set
of current close in shore

The northerly set of currents varies
it is governed by the winds

I have noticed on the western end
of Little Island bank that before a
change of wind the currents will
change to 3 or 4 different directions
in 4 or 5 hours

Irrespective of winds the prevailing
current of the current is westerly
and it is stronger off shore on the
banks than what it is in shore

Santa light is about 4 miles
distant from Little Island light

Bergen Falkner

Santa at Bergen
in the body of Bay
the 14 day of April
1873 Ref-3

Unknecht

James A. Williams Recounted

The Ships of the White Star Line were originally intended to burn from fifty five to sixty tons of coal per day but when the coals are bad as they were on the last voyage the consumption goes up to seventy tons to obtain the same amount of steam.

The Company have contracted and paid for the best coal in the market and therefore the Company cannot be held responsible for the quality of the coal supplied by the coal owners.

The English portion of the coal supplied to the Atlantic appeared to me to have lain at the pit mouth for sometime so that the heating properties were very much impaired. Had the coals been of the quality expected by the Company she would have had fourteen and a half days full consumption. No ship of the White Star Line having made a passage longer than thirteen days and a half from Liverpool to New York. Extra coal supplied on the previous voyage were put on board to prevent taking any in New York.

There was an ample supply of provisions on board of the ship thirty two days supply having been passed by the Government inspectors at Liverpool. What we were really short of was salt fish and potatoes for the Roman Catholic portion of the passengers the salt fish and potatoes having been washed over during a gale we experienced on the twenty fifth and twenty sixth day of March.

The seamen we had here as good as the average. The class of seamen obtained in Liverpool have deserted since the doing away with the compulsory apprentice system. If we obtain ten seamen out of a crew of forty we consider ourselves fortunate.

The best run made by the ship during her last passage was three hundred miles made in twenty four hours and a half and that was with a following sea a fresh easterly gale and all sails set.

Her best speed under steam without canvas was from eleven to twelve knots.

The second officer was not in the chart room when the ship struck.

I felt the ship strike. The Quarter Master was at the ^{standby} wheel house when I passed out.

I met the second officer at the fore part of the wheel house. He was coming from the bridge. I said to him Mr. Medcalf. You are in collusion why did you not call me. He replied we are on the rocks. I then gave him orders to muster the crew at the boat stations.

In reply to Em Macdonald Esq's Commission

~~From noon until one o'clock A.M. on the thirty first we were steering about North West by North with two degrees easterly deviation~~

From noon until one o'clock P.M. on the thirty first we were steering about West Seven degrees South true, and made about seven miles

The distance from the ship's position at noon on the thirty first, would be about to the point where she struck would be about the same as the distance to Sombrero

I account for the fact that the ship traversed this distance of one hundred and seventy miles - in fourteen hours and a quarter, while her log showed a maximum speed of only eleven knots, solely from the current

The total strength of the ~~the~~ number of the ship's crew including officers and men were one hundred and forty six

The passenger list is lost but I believe that there were eight hundred and eleven passengers aboard thirty five of whom were cabin passengers

About two hundred and fifty of these came

came on board at Queenstown. I think that is about the number, but I have no proper list of them.

Of the nine hundred and fifty seven persons on board the ship, I think four hundred and twenty two are Seamen.

I hold a Certificate of Competency as Extra Master. The number is I think 22216.

I believe the Certificate was lost with the ship.

There were about fifteen men beside the two on the ~~deck~~^{lower deck} over the Quarter Master in the watch during which the ship struck.

It was the duty of the men to wash decks during that watch commencing at midnight and therefore all the men of the watch must have been on deck at that time.

The Captain wishes here to state that he thought the heavy weathering winds which prevailed during the winter up to the

127

end of march would have neutralized
the heavy westerly set

I fully expected to have at daylight
the land to Eastward of Beaufort
harbour aboard

Land to at Beaufort } Is a William
in the land of
Beaufort M. 14.
des of April
arrived } Before

Innumerable

Cont. arrived at 6 o'clock P.M.
to receive business on Friday next the
18th met at 3 P.M.

Charles J. Macomber
 Clerk to Commission

Beaufort 28 April 1873

Cont. met at 3 P.M. ~~secretly~~ 'accused'
to adjourn - present the Commission
Capt. Scott & Mr. Kenzie

When the Commission arrived up
the evidence and delivered the
following judgment -

The wreck of the Steam Ship Atlantic and the loss of life unhappily attending it - into the causes of which this Court has been enquiring has been one of the most frightful marine disasters of this Century. A magnificent ship one of the finest ever built with nearly a thousand souls on board and a valuable cargo was run at full speed upon the rocks of our coast - and in a few minutes became a total wreck and more than five hundred souls were hurried into eternity.

The object of this Enquiry has been to ascertain if possible whether this disaster so appalling in its consequences was one of those mysterious dispensations of Providence the result of causes beyond the power of human prudence skill and foresight to have prevented or whether it arose from the want of that prudence skill and foresight on the part of those charged with the care and safe keeping of so much property and so many valuable ^{during the progress of the Enquiry} lives - ~~in~~ which I have been assisted by Captain P. A. Scott and Captain Geo. A. McKenzie. every effort has been made to obtain a full statement of the facts from such of the survivors as were in a position to know any of the causes of the disaster and the circumstances immediately attending it. But throughout the investigation the difficulty has been felt that in consequence of the total loss of all the ship's records the witnesses have had to depend upon

the total loss of all the ship's records
 the witnesses have had to depend upon
 their memory only in stating circumstances
 and data upon which the judgment to be
 given in the case must largely depend,
 and it may be that under the
 excitement naturally arising from the
 circumstances of the case, the evidence
 given ~~in~~ ^{on} some ~~cases~~ ^{points} may not have been
 so ample and accurate in matters of
 detail as it might have been had the
 memory been assisted by the log book and
 other records of the ship.

From the evidence taken it appears
 that the Steam Ship ^{of the registry, Ray Line, 923 3/4 tons} Atlantic, sailed
 from Liverpool on the 20th day of
 March and Queenstown on the 21st of
 March for New York, Commanded

by Captain John William who
 held a Certificate as Extra Master.

First Officer Sam W Smith ^{holding} Certificate as Master
 Second " " " " " "

Third " " C L Bracey, Certificate of Mate

Fourth " " John Brown " "

With a total of 811 passengers including
 35 Saloon
 and a crew of 141 men,

making a total on board of 957 persons
 of whom ^{are believed to} 535 have been lost or drowned
 and 422 saved.

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The Ship seems to have had fair weather and experienced no difficulty until about the 2nd day of March when she encountered a gale which continued for three days - during which she made comparatively ^{slow} ~~little~~ progress. Her speed being reported at from seven to eight knots per hour. - At noon on Monday the thirty first day of March ^{her position} ~~her position~~ by observation was made out to be

to be about being 460 miles distant from Sandy Hook - The Chief Engineer reported only 127 tons of coal remaining in the bunkers and the wind continuing ahead and the glass giving indication of unfavorable weather, Captain Williams after a consultation with his first Officer and Chief Engineer, prudently decided not to attempt to reach New York with so short a supply of coal, but to change his course and head up for Quebec. During the three preceding days the ship had been on a reduced consumption of coal - and from the fact that after this reduced consumption she was found on the eleventh day of the passage with less than forty eight hours ^{supply} ~~coal~~ remaining, the inference seems inevitable, that she had not sufficient coal on board when sailed, for a ship of her class. From the Engineers we have the information that when using best coals her consumption was from 55 to 60 tons per day. She had on board before leaving Liverpool a total of 967 tons of which 80 tons

were used before her voyage was commenced leaving only fourteen days supply had the coals been of the best quality. But the coals instead of being of the best quality were a mixture of Welsh and English of which she consumed 70 tons per day and this gave her less than 13 days supply when leaving ~~Liverpool~~ ^{part.} Had the circumstances of the passage been favorable and no difficulties from head winds ~~and~~ ^{or} foul weather been experienced. this quantity of coal might undoubtedly have carried the ship and her passengers safely to their port of destination. But a passage across the Atlantic in the winter season without more or less of unfavorable weather is the exception and not the rule. Favorable weather during the whole western passage in the month of March could not reasonably be expected; - and the contingency of a low rate of speed ^{resulting} from head winds and foul weather ought to have been provided for.

Under the circumstances, Captain William seems to have been justified in changing his course and being up for Halifax.

During the hour from the time the ship's position by observation was obtained on the 31st until one P.M. a distance of about seven miles westward was ~~made~~ ^{run}. which made her position by Captain William's statement to be at the time her course was changed latitude $41^{\circ} 39'$ north longitude $63^{\circ} 54'$ west and distant about 170 miles from Sambre. Assuming this position

to be correct, the course steered North 24 East, or North 33° East magnetic, should have carried her well to the Eastward of Sombro, had there been no current. It ~~is~~ appears in the evidence that azimuths were obtained during the afternoon, and the bearing of the Pole Star taken during the night to correct the error of the compass. If ~~the~~ the evidence on these points is correct (and it must be remembered that these facts are given from memory only) then it is very apparent ^{that} the ship ^{must} have been set to the westward by a current of something over ~~one~~ ^{one} knot per hour. At midnight ~~the~~ ^{she} ship was estimated by the commanding officer at intervals of two hours, to have run 12.2 miles, or an average of 11 miles per hour from the time her course was changed, which would place her within about ~~100~~ ¹⁰⁰ miles of Sombro. At that hour the watch was changed, the first ~~part~~ ^{part} of the officers going below, the ship being left in charge of the second and fourth officers. ~~From~~ ^{From} after midnight the Captain left the deck and retired to his chart room, giving orders to his servant to call him at 2.40 and to the officer of the watch to call him at 3 o'clock, or sooner if they made the light, or if there was any change in the weather. During the three hours, no light was seen. The Captain's servant came to call him at 2.40, as he was ordered, but was prevented from ~~so~~ ^{from} doing ^{by} the second officer. It also appears that these officers left in charge

to save themselves by the rope communication from the wreck to the rock and from the rock to the shore, that had been established by some of the petty officers of the ship. The ship falling over so quickly after striking, made it impossible to ^{successfully} lower any of her boats and before assistance could reach them by boat from the fishermen residing in that locality many of those who had succeeded in reaching the deck before the ship fell over, were swept into the sea and ~~were~~ drowned.

I have already said that I believe the action of Captain Williams in leaving up for Halifax at one P.M. on the 31st March was prudent and justifiable and also that his conduct as well as that of his officers from the time that the ship struck was marked by intrepidity and coolness, and a desire to do everything in their power to save the lives of those who had been entrusted to their care. But I regret that I find it impossible to speak with approval of the management of the ship from the time her course was changed at 1 P.M. on Monday until the time she ~~struck the~~ ^{became a} ~~rock~~ ^{wreck} on the morning of Tuesday.

The fact of the ship striking the land at a point some 12 or 13 miles westward of that which Captain Williams believed the course he was steering ought to have made ~~may be~~ ^{is} accounted for by the westerly current which usually prevails to a greater or lesser extent on the Coast of Nova Scotia and which is known to run

with greater force during the months of March
 April and May than during ~~any~~ ^{any} other seasons
 of the Year. Whether or not sufficient allowance
 was made by Captain Williams for ~~this~~ ^{the} ~~current~~
 current, in the course that he steered,
 does not seem to be a question of
 vital importance; for it is very probable
 that the same ~~fact~~ error as to the
 speed of the ship, and the want of
 vigilance ^{on the part of} the officers who were on duty
 which is too apparent, and the ~~utter~~ ^{absolute} ~~total~~
 neglect to ~~take~~ ^{obtain} soundings, or use the
 most ordinary precautions that ought to
 be used in approaching the coast, would
 have run the ship ashore. Had she been
 on the course that Captain Williams supposed
 her to be, — the distance from her point-
 of departure at 1 P.M. on Monday to the
 land, had her course been correctly held,
 being about the same, as the distance
 from that point of departure to the spot
 where she was wrecked. It seems to be
 impossible to account in any other way
 than by want of vigilance for the fact
 of no lights being seen. It has been
 proved that Sombro Island, Chebucto
 Head, and Devils Island lights were
 all in good order on that night —
 Sombro light was distinctly visible from
 the Devils Island light a distance of
 about nine ^{and a half} miles, at a little before
 the time the ship struck, and when
 she could not have been more than
 7 or 8 miles distant from Sombro light
 the night seems to have been fine

~~the~~
 Atlanta ~~could not have been more than 5 or 6~~ ^{4 or 5}
 miles distant. ~~The night was so dark that~~
~~for~~ Capt. William states that at midnight
 when he left the deck, and again when
 he came on deck after the ship struck,
~~the vessel~~ The night was fine, stars
 being visible, & that the light might have
 been ~~seen~~ ^{seen} ~~put out~~ at a distance of 4 or 5
 miles and ^{that} even the land was night-
 have been seen at 2 or 3 miles distance
 line of the men on deck ~~have sworn that at one~~
 time or little short was full, ~~and that the~~
 night was very ~~black~~ ^{Some of the men on deck have sworn} — that at one time
~~during~~ that interval between 12 and 3 o'clock it
 was very black and some ^{fine} short fully;
 but the whole weight of the testimony goes to
 show that the night was one ^{in which} that the light
 might have been seen, even night to have
 been seen, ^{some have before this disaster} if or perhaps, ~~was~~ vigilance
 look out had been kept.

A grave error must have been
 made in estimating the speed of the
 ship. From a reduced rate of consumption
 of coal and a speed of 7 knots previous
 to her course being changed on Monday
 the consumption of coal was increased
 after ^{she got up to 10 knots} ~~that time~~ to her full allowance and
 for her highest rate of speed. It is in
 evidence that under favorable circumstances
~~under~~ ^{with} steam alone the "Atlanta" would
 make from 12 to 13 knots per hour. After
 bearing up for Halifax at 1 p. m. on
 Monday the circumstances were most
 favorable for ~~attaining her~~ ^{obtaining her} ~~best~~ rate of
 speed, the wind being free and the water

Smooth. Yet we find that at midnight Capt Williams estimated that she had made an average of only 11 knots, an estimate which the event proves must have been inaccurate.

~~The log~~ ^{Only the common log was used,}
^{and this only at intervals of two hours}
 and the officers of the ship seem to have left the duties of heaving the log and noting the rate of speed on the log slate, to the Quartermaster. ~~There is no evidence of any northern~~ From the time when the ship bore up for Halifax until she struck she made an average of 12 knots per hour ^{assigning the point of departure at one o'clock on Monday to}
^{having been correctly ascertained}
 there is no evidence of any northern set of current to account for the difference between the distance which the ship actually ran up to midnight and that which the Capt supposed her to have run, ^{estimating by the log} ~~estimating by the log~~.

It is stated that sometimes a change of wind will produce a change of current for a few hours on the La Have and Sable I² Banks at a distance off shore of 50 to 70 miles; but it is a well authenticated fact that during the spring months there is no continuous northerly set of current on this coast. The fact that the body of one of the passengers from the Atlantic was picked up a few days after the wreck at a distance of 25 miles to the West and South and that 2 trunks from the wreck were picked up at a distance of 18 miles in the same direction show that ~~the current~~ ^{the} ~~is no current~~ sets ~~from~~ off shore.

^{Bates & Bates}
 Merchandise drifting ^{scattered} from the "S. Shawan" wrecked at Clam Harbor on the 2^d April last year proved the same fact

~~and we have an annual confirmation of the~~
 Sales of merchandise drifting seaward from
 the S.S. Dacian wrecked at Clam Harbor on
 3rd April last year proved ~~that~~ the existence
 of an off shore current at that time; and
 we have an annual confirmation of
 the fact of an offshore current, in the
 circumstance that the ice drifting from
 the Northward, ~~around Cape Norton~~
~~very rarely after passing~~
~~Cape Canoe comes within sight of our~~
 instead of lining our coast closely as
 would be the case if a northern current
~~prevailed~~ ^{is} very rarely seen in sight of our
 shores to the westward of Canoe. It
 seems therefore impossible to account for the
 error in ^{estimating} the ships speed except ~~from~~ on
 the ground of ^{incompetency} ~~carelessness~~ or carelessness
 in calculating on the part of those attending
 to the log.

I have also to ^{observe} ~~notice~~ the
~~fact~~ ^{the circumstance} that the Captain leaving the deck after
 midnight seems to me to have been at
 least imprudent, and calculated to create the
 impression on the minds of the officers on
 duty that they were not so near land as to
 make extra vigilance ~~so~~ imperative.
 Capt Williams states that at that time
 he believed himself to be 48 miles from
 land. ~~It is~~ In this belief it is now known
 that he must have been mistaken and
 it seems to have been culpable rashness
 for him under the circumstances, ^{to order}
^{the ship to be run} ~~the ship to be run~~ for 3 hours at her then
 rate of speed ~~towards the land~~ without
 taking ~~any extra~~ precautions ^{against danger}
 of possible error in his estimate ^{of his position}

in the event of the light which ought to have been seen ^{at 18 or 20 miles distance} not becoming visible in that time. ~~Had there been a loss~~ Had the very ordinary precaution been taken of sending a lookout at intervals to the mast head, the disaster would in all human probability have been prevented. But the greatest and I may say perhaps the fatal error is found in the fact that the lead was never used although the ship was in soundings for 8 hours before she struck.

This is ~~an~~ a neglect of duty for which there can be positively no excuse. ~~Had the lead been used at proper intervals, so~~ accurately are the soundings laid down upon the chart that had the lead been used at proper intervals the ship's safety would have been guaranteed ~~and she would have made the~~ even had the night been one on which the lights could not possibly have been seen. It is true that the frequent use of the lead might have delayed her for a few hours in reaching port, but there was nothing to be gained in point of time by making the port before daylight and even if there had been, those few hours of detention ought not to have been allowed to weigh ~~against~~ against the safety of the ~~hundreds of lives that have been lost~~ by the neglect of this plainly manifest nearly 1000 lives that were imperilled ^{and} more than half of which have been lost by the neglect of this plainly manifest duty.

From a careful review of all the facts of the case I feel compelled to state

my belief that the conduct of Capt Williams ^{in the management of his ship} during the 12 or 14 hours preceeding the disaster was ~~marked by~~ so gravely at variance with what ought to have been the conduct of a man placed in his responsible position; as to call for severe censure and to justify me ~~in saying~~ ^{and master} that his Certificate as extra master ~~should be suspended for the space of two years~~. Cancelled; but ~~in consideration of~~ ^{the praiseworthy and energetic efforts ~~that he made~~ ^{made by him} to save the ship's life after the ship struck, the mitigated} penalty of suspension of certificate for two years should be imposed.

I also feel it my duty to state that the conduct of Mr Brown the fourth officer in preventing the Capt's servant from calling Capt Williams ~~as ordered~~ at 20 minutes to 3 was under the circumstances an improper violation of the Capt's order ^{and faulted in}. The fact that he as one of the officers of the watch after 12 o'clock ought to have seen the light and did not see it and ought to have seen the land and did not see it, there is an implied ^{culpable} ~~was~~ neglect and want of vigilance ~~calling for the~~ ^{proper} which ~~judicial~~ ^{judicial} considerations of public safety demand should be marked by censure and moderate punishment. I therefore ^{advised} ~~decide~~ that the certificate of 4th officer Brown as master should be ^{be suspended for a period of} ~~suspended for three~~ ^{weeks} ~~months~~. I have ~~the~~ ^{also} that Capt M. Scott is Captain of the ship ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~service~~ ^{service} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~navy~~ ^{navy} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~service~~ ^{service} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~navy~~ ^{navy} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~service~~ ^{service} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~navy~~ ^{navy} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~service~~ ^{service} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~navy~~ ^{navy} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~service~~ ^{service} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~navy~~ ^{navy} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~service~~ ^{service} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~navy~~ ^{navy} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~service~~ ^{service} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~navy~~ ^{navy} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~service~~ ^{service} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~navy~~ ^{navy} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~service~~ ^{service} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~navy~~ ^{navy} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~service~~ ^{service} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~navy~~ ^{navy} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~service~~ ^{service} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~navy~~ ^{navy} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~service~~ ^{service} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~navy~~ ^{navy} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~service~~ ^{service} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~navy~~ ^{navy} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~service~~ ^{service} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~navy~~ ^{navy} ~~and~~ 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Herbarium in tuta rubra

in tuta

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